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I. INTRODUCTION
Confusion over the meaning of probability and over the rationale
for probabilistic inference has led many courts to dismiss "lost
chance" lawsuits unfairly, or to modify unnecessarily the traditional
concepts of causation or compensable injury. In this Article, I attempt
to clarify the legal concept of probability, and I propose a theory for
when we are warranted in drawing a "direct inference" from objective
statistical data about groups to a subjective assessment of probability
for a particular plaintiff. I then show that a number of legal problems
in the lost chance cases can be resolved without radical modifications
to traditional concepts. Perhaps more importantly, I argue that direct
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inference in a legal context is warranted and compelled not by a

logical theory, but rather by a policy of minimal fairness to the parties.
In a typical "lost chance" case, a patient is initially at risk for
some injury or perhaps death, through no fault of the defendant.'
Some negligent act by the defendant, however, causes the plaintiff to

incur an increase in risk for that same injury, and the plaintiff in fact
subsequently suffers the injury. The most difficult cases are those in
which the plaintiff had a very high initial risk of injury (over 50%),
and experts are unable to testify that the defendant's negligence (as
opposed to the pre-existing condition) probably caused the plaintiff's
injury.' Under traditional judicial doctrines, it might seem that such
cases should not reach the jury because the plaintiff is unable to
produce sufficient evidence on the issue of causation so that a jury
could reasonably find that the defendant's negligent act probably

caused the injury.
The lost chance cases present difficult and interconnected prob-

lems involving statistical evidence, causation, compensability of risk
as injury, public policy on medical malpractice, and fairness, and
therefore present great opportunity for confusion. With respect to
causation, there are questions about the meaning or nature of causation,3 the legal sufficiency of statistical evidence about causation,4
1. See, e.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 49 (Mich. 1990) (stating that
survival rate from amniotic fluid embolism would have been only 37.5% even if intravenous
line had been connected prior to onset); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 179
(N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aft'd, 337 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1975) (only 20% to 40% opportunity of
survival with proper treatment); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash.
1983) (stating that there was only a 39% chance of survival when lung cancer was misdiagnosed; however, by the time the patient was diagnosed with cancer, his chances of survival
had been reduced to 25%).
2. See cases cited supra note 1; DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 136-37 (Iowa
1986) (citing nine prior cases). The less difficult lost chance cases present a similar problem
of distinguishing between a baseline case and a defendant-caused injury, but the relatively
low baseline risks have allowed courts to send the cases to the jury. E.g., Rewis v. United
States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1974) (referring to testimony that a child was more
likely than not to have survived salicylate poisoning if defendant had properly diagnosed and
treated the illness); Glicklich v. Spievack, 452 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (recounting plaintiff's evidence that upon a proper diagnosis of her breast cancer she would
have had a 94% chance of surviving 10 years, which was reduced to "a 50% or less chance
of ten year survival" by defendant's negligence; this was sufficient evidence of causation to
create a question for the jury); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 1978) (referring
to testimony that patient bad a 75% chance of surviving his heart attack if he had been
properly treated when admitted to the hospital).
3. For example, there is a question as to whether the appropriate test of causation
should be "but for" or "substantial factor." Compare, e.g., Sharp v. Kaiser. Found. Health
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and the legal significance of uncertainty about causation.5 With rePlan, 710 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Colo. CL App. 1985) (substantial factor) and Evers v. Dollinger,
471 A.2d 405, 413-15 (N.J. 1984) (substantial factor) and Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477-78
(substantial factor) with Comfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) (but for)
and Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971) (issue of proximate
cause to be submitted to jury only if sufficient evidence that without negligence "the patient
probably would have survived").
There is also a question as to whether causation should be an "all-or-nothing" hurdle
for the plaintiff, or whether the courts should adopt "proportional causation." Compare, e.g.,
Kallenberg, 45 A.D.2d at 178 (plaintiff recovered full damages for wrongful death) with
Herskovits 664 P.2d at 486-87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (criticizing standard "but for" test of
causation, allowing all-or-nothing recovery, as arbitrary, ineffective in allocating loss, and
inequitable because it allows defendant to have the benefit of the uncertainty in causation
created by defendant's own negligent conduct); cf. Dumas v. Cooney, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 584,
589-92 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing without distinction the traditional rule of "probability" as
"more likely than not" caused by defendant and a "not-better-than-even chance" of survival
absent negligence, and declining "to establish a more lenient standard of causation . . . to
account for the theory of lost chance"); DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 137-38 (stating that allowing recovery for all damages would be "an extreme position" and less equitable than
allowing only a proportion of damages).
4. Compare, e.g., Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 478 ("Where percentage probabilities and decreased probabilities are submitted into evidence, there is simply no danger of speculation on
the part of the jury. More speculation is involved in requiring the medical expert to testify as
to what would have happened had the defendant not been negligent.") with Fennell v. Southem Md. Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment because a 40% lost chance of surviving bacterial meningitis was insufficient evidence that defendant caused plaintiff's death) and Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 487-91
(Brachtenbach, J.,dissenting) (stating that statistical evidence alone is not sufficient to prove
causation); cf Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1299-300 (Md. 1987) (holding that because plaintiff's chances for a recovery from osteomyelitis absent defendant's negligence were
only "possible," plaintiff failed to prove causation by a "probability," where court defined
"probability" as "greater than 50% chance").
5. Compare, e.g., Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 49-50 & n.20 (allowing recovery in part
because but for defendants' negligence, there would have been no uncertainty whether
defendants' omissions caused patient's death) and Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp.,
Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz. 1984) (adopting rule that permitted case to go to jury on
opinions of experts "unwilling or unable to quantify" the lost chance and stating only that
there would have been a "substantially better chance" absent the negligence, but jury instructions still required defendant verdict unless jury finds "a probability that defendant's negligence was a cause of plaintiff's injury") and Kallenberg, 45 A.D.2d at 179 (recounting testimony that failure to administer proper medication was a "producing, contributing factor" to
the patient's death and deprived patient of "a 20, say 30, maybe 40% chance of survival"
was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict finding defendant a legal cause of plaintiff's
death) with Dumas, I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595 (rejecting lost chance theory as awarding damages
for mere possibilities without proof that defendant, rather than the underlying illness, caused
the injury) and Fennell, 580 A.2d at 211, 214 (holding that plaintiff can only recover when
plaintiff proves defendant's negligence probably caused plaintiff's injury; the greater than 50%
preponderance of the evidence standard must be maintained) and Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104
(holding that since the issue of proximate cause can be submitted to the jury only if sufficient evidence that absent defendant's negligence patient "probably" would have survived,
expert opinion that patient's expectation of survival was "maybe . .. around 50%" was legal-
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spect to the injury, there are questions about whether an increased
risk or a lost chance for a good outcome is in itself an injury to a
protected interest, and therefore compensable6 (and if so, which lost
chances are compensable),7 the necessity of producing quantitative
evidence of the magnitude of the chance lost,' and how the value of
the lost chance should be determined.9 Each of these problems is
difficult independently, and they also create confusion collectively
because they all involve resolving the relevance of statistical evidence
and the legal significance of uncertainty as to proof.

The lost chance cases present in a compelling form the general
problem posed by the presence of "residual baseline risk," a problem
that I have elsewhere discussed as the "baseline risk paradox."'" Rely insufficient to create jury issue).
6. Compare, e.g., Evers, 471 A.2d at 409 (holding that an increased risk of recurrence
due to delay in diagnosis of cancer is recoverable if it is a substantial factor in actually
bringing about a recurrence) and Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 102-04 (holding that loss of chance
of recovery, standing alone, is not an injury for which damages will flow) with DeBurkarte,
393 N.W.2d at 137-38 (allowing recovery only for the lost chance of survival, not the underlying injury) and Evers, 471 A.2d at 417-22 (Handler, J., concurring) (arguing that plaintiff
should be able to recover for increased risk of recurrence of cancer even before recurrence
actually happens).
7. For discussions of whether all lost chances should be compensable, see James v.
United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (any lost chance of prolonging life or
decreasing suffering can be compensated, no matter how small that chance may have been);
or only lost chances that are "significant" or "substantial," see McKellips v. Saint Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 474-75 (Okla. 1987); or only "better than even" chances, as exemplified by Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1463-67 (D. Kan. 1989) (granting a
lung cancer patient a recovery for loss of 51% chance of survival for 5 years).
8. See, e.g., Fennell, 580 A.2d at 213-14 (criticizing probabilities, statistical evidence,
and a substantial portion of evidence in lost chance cases, as "unreliable, misleading, easily
manipulated, and confusing to a jury"); Cooper, 533 A.2d at 1299 n.8 (stating that most
courts allowing lost chance theory of damages have done so when quantitative proof was
present in order to calculate damages); Evers, 471 A.2d at 416 (Handler, J., concurring) (stating that actual increased risk of harm, "even though not measurable or quantifiable," can
sometimes be compensable); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476 (statistical data necessary but not
"sufficient" for determining amount of damages); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288
n.9 (Pa. 1978) (recounting expert testimony that 75% chance of survival was lost due to
defendant's negligence and that such was sufficient basis for jury to find "that it was more
likely than not that the defendant's omissions were a substantial factor in causing" the
patient's death).
9. See, e.g., Boody, 706 F. Supp. at 1467 (finding that best method of calculating
damages is not full compensation for death, but that percentage of value of plaintiff's life
that was lost due to defendant's negligence); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476-77 (holding that
plaintiff should be awarded "percent of chance lost multiplied by the total amount of damages which are ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death action"); . Glicklich v. Spievack, 452
N.E.2d 287 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (finding damages reasonably apportioned between defendants based on chance of recovery and life expectancy reduced by each defendant).
10. Vern R. Walker, The Concept of Baseline Risk in Tort Litigation, 80 Ky. L.J. 631,
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sidual baseline risk occurs when a particular plaintiff's injury might
have been caused by the defendant or might have been caused by

other (baseline) causes. If we consider persons in a similar situation
as the plaintiff with respect to risk factors for the relevant injury (i.e.,
those in the "reference situation")," some subset would have injuries
caused by the defendant's negligence, while the remainder are "baseline cases" whose causes are to be found in the risk factors other
than the defendant's negligence. In cases in which there is residual

(non-zero) baseline risk, the task for the finder of fact is to determine
whether the particular plaintiff at bar is a baseline injury or a defendant-caused injury.
Although the lost chance cases are merely examples of cases
involving residual baseline risk, they constitute a special and important species of such cases because in them the proportion of persons
in the reference situation with defendant-caused injuries is often directly estimable.12 The proportion of defendant-caused injuries is "directly" estimable in the sense that the risk of death or injury can be
estimated for the time of the negligence (e.g., when a misdiagnosis

was made of an underlying cancer) and then again for a later time
(the time when the correct diagnosis is made and acted on), with the
difference between the two risks being attributed to the defendant's

negligence. For example, if at the time of a defendant's negligent
misdiagnosis the plaintiff had a 61% chance of death within 5 years
from the pre-existing lung cancer that the defendant misdiagnosed,

and 6 months later, at the time the correct diagnosis was made, that

665-72 (1991-92).
11. The "reference situation" can be defined as consisting of all the factors present in
the plaintiff's/patient's situation that influence the likelihood of the injury occurring, including
any negligent conduct of the defendant. Thus, it is a conjunction of all the relevant risk
factors in the plaintiff's case. See Walker, supra note 10, at 643.
12. In the more general toxic tort case involving residual baseline risk, exemplified by a
plaintiff who was exposed by the defendant to a toxic agent and who subsequently developed
a non-specific kind of cancer, it is first necessary to determine whether the defendant caused
any additional cancer cases at all over the baseline, and if so, how many, before reaching
the question whether this plaintiff was one of those cases. Typically, the toxic tort plaintiff
might rely upon epidemiologic evidence of a statistically significant increased relative risk of
those in the reference situation exposed by the defendant's negligence, as compared with
those otherwise in the reference situation except not so exposed, in order to establish that
defendant-caused cases exist and to estimate the proportion of defendant-caused cases to baseline cases. These two determinations are subject to conceptual, measurement, sampling, modeling, and causal uncertainty. See Walker, supra note 10, at 647-65. Therefore, in the typical
toxic tort case involving residual baseline risk, the plaintiff's evidence will contain significant
uncertainties that are minimized in the lost chance cases.
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risk had increased to 75%, then the defendant's negligence is held
responsible for an increased risk of 14 percentage points. 3 Because
the reference situation is defined as the set of all relevant risk factors,
including the defendant's negligence, the proportions can be estimated
from the time of the correct diagnosis: at that time, 25% are still expected to survive longer than 5 years, 61% could be expected to die
within 5 years of the pre-existing cancer (and would be expected to
do so even in the absence of negligence), and 14% are expected to
die within 5 years because of the delay in treatment brought about by

the misdiagnosis. 4 Given proof that a particular plaintiff actually
suffered the alleged injury, the question is whether the plaintiff's
injury is a baseline injury or a defendant-caused injury.
There is, however, a paradox associated with this inference from
the generic risks to the particular plaintiff. In trying to classify the

particular individual as a baseline case or a defendant-caused case, we
intuitively search for additional information about this plaintiff that

provides a basis for the classification. The paradox is that, regardless
of how much distinguishing evidence is introduced, the existence of

continued baseline risk after that new information has been taken into
account still renders the classification speculative or arbitrary. If it
would have been arbitrary at the outset to assert that the particular

plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's culpable act, then
(paradoxically) additional information that does not entirely eliminate
residual baseline risk seems not to eliminate that arbitrariness. 5

13. The percentages are drawn from Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474,
475 (Wash. 1983).
14. Thus, a point estimate of the relative risk of death from being in the reference
situation (with defendant's negligence), as compared to the risk from being in the reference
situation but absent the defendant's negligence, is 75/61 = 1.23, approximately-an elevated
relative risk, but one substantially smaller than 2.0 (at which point the increase due to defendant-caused risk equals the baseline risk). See Walker, supra note 10, at 651-57.
15. I have elsewhere discussed the "baseline risk paradox," Walker, supra note 10, at
665-72, namely that assigning the particular plaintiff to membership in either of these two
exclusive sets appears to be epistemologically arbitrary.
Additional information about the particular plaintiff's risk factors does not eliminate
the problem unless it eliminates all residual baseline risk (thus resulting in no baseline cases).
If we had additional information about this plalntiff that would seem to indicate that she is
in one set or the other (e.g., that she had a genetic history of a certain sort), then that information about the plaintiff would also be a risk factor and as such included in the reference
situation. In other words, taking such "new" information into account might well lead us to
adjust our proportions for defendant-caused and baseline cases. See, e.g., Rewis v. United
States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1205-11 (5th Cir. 1974) (concluding that, in case of misdiagnosis of
aspirin poisoning in child, it is essential that there be examination at trial of assumptions
concerning aspirin ingestion rate, absorption rate into bloodstream, and elimination rate from
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Many courts have handled this problem of residual baseline risk

by using a "bright line rule" of simply comparing the relative size of
the defendant-caused risk and the residual baseline risk. On this approach, if the residual baseline risk is less than the defendant-caused
risk, then motions attacking the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence
will be denied and the case will automatically go to the jury.'6 On
the other hand, if the residual baseline risk exceeds the defendantcaused risk, then some courts have concluded that the plaintiff has
not produced sufficient evidence to create a jury issue-at least under
traditional theories of causation and liability.'7 It is this latter type of

blood in particular patient, because if she did not fit the assumed characteristics on these
factors "there is at least an equal chance that she would have fallen below the line indicated
[the line above which fatalities are likely to occur], in which event she would have shown
up on the chart as one patient who survived"); cf. Chudson v. Ratra, 548 A.2d 172, 179-80
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (stating that where more specific evidence is not possible, courts,
whether using the "more probable than not" or "some lesser standard," have allowed juries
"to determine probabilities based directly or indirectly on universal statistics or even on the
expert's general experience with other patients," either out of necessity or "based upon a tacit
recognition that even estimates of probabilities tailored specifically to a given patient are
ultimately derived from generally accepted statistical norms"), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 894
(1989).
As long as residual baseline risk remains (that is,as long as the new information
does not reduce the baseline injuries to zero), the problem persists of how to place this
plaintiff in one set or the other in a way that is epistemologically nonarbitrary. The paradox
is that any new information that merely shifts the proportions and does not eliminate the
baseline cases does not seem to save the ultimate decision from being epistemologically arbitrary. Therefore, an exploration of the lost chance cases will also shed light on this paradox.
See infra parts II,III. Part of the problem to be explored is the logical relevance of the size
of the proportions of defendant-caused and baseline cases, and the rationale for why size
might remove or reduce arbitrariness.
16. See, e.g., Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 589 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
where testimony establishes a better-than-even chance of survival absent negligence, "a finding
for the plaintiff is consistent with existing principles of proximate cause"); Cooper v.
Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1299-300 (Md. 1987) (under "traditional rule" governing burden of
proof as to causation, plaintiffs have burden of proving patient "had a better than 50%
chance of full recovery absent the malpractice"). It is noteworthy that courts have not offered
guidance on how the jury is supposed to use this evidence to reach a valid determination of
causation. If the only reasonable approach were to use this same decision rule to make the
ultimate determination, plaintiffs might be entitled to a favorable determination as a matter of
law. The problem of what decision rule the jury should employ, in addition to the court, is
also the topic of this Article.
17. See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., 445 So.2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984)
(holding that defendant was entitled to directed verdict as matter of law unless plaintiff produces "evidence of a greater than even chance of survival" absent negligence); Fennell v.
Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr, Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 211 (Md. 1990) (finding that 40% lost chance
of surviving bacterial meningitis insufficient evidence that defendant caused plaintiff's death);
Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn. 1980) (holding that plaintiff must show
that it was more probable than not that death resulted from defendant's negligence).
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case that presents the most compelling plea for fairness, and these
lost chance cases have led courts to rethink various traditional doctrines in an effort to allow at least some such cases to be sent to the

jury.
I argue, however, that in either type of case-whether the defendant-caused risk is greater than the baseline risk or less than the
baseline risk-there is a fallacy underlying the "bright line rule"
itself, regardless of the size of the baseline risk. The appropriate
reasoning is far more complicated than merely comparing the relative
size of these two risks. We recognize that the frequency of defendantcaused cases of injury might be very small, relative to the number of
baseline cases, but the plaintiff's injury might still be caused by the
defendant." The issue is not relative size, but the probability that
this plaintiffs injury is in fact a defendant-caused injury or a baseline
injury. On the other hand, it is not enough merely to point out that
the relative size of the two risks is not as determinative as many
courts have suggested. Relative size of risk does seem relevant to the
determination. And if the relative size of the defendant-caused risk to
the baseline risk is not a direct determinant of the probability that the
plaintiff's injury was a defendant-created instance rather than a baseline case, what exactly is the logical relationship involved? And when
are we warranted in making a "direct inference" from generic statistics about groups to a probability for classifying a particular
plaintiffs injury as baseline or defendant-caused?
In this Article, I use the lost chance cases to examine the logical
conditions for such a warranted direct inference in legal factfinding. I
first set out various interpretations of what "probable" means when
used in the lost chance cases. This is the topic of part I. In part II, I
use this discussion of the meaning of probability, together with an
examination of two contemporary epistemological theories of direct
inference, to propose an analysis of the appropriate conditions for the
type of direct inference central to resolving the lost chance cases. My

18. One court has made this point in a compelling way, although it shed no light on
the correct resolution of the inference problem:
To say that a patient would have had a ninety-nine percent opportunity of survival
if given proper treatment, does not mean that the physician's negligence was the
cause in fact if the patient would have been among the unfortunate one percent
who would have died. A physician's carelessness may, similarly, be the actual
cause of physical harm although the patient had only a one percent opportunity of
surviving even with flawless medical attention.
Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 1990).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:247

proposal is that the direct inference is not warranted by any
epistemological guarantee of validity, but is required under certain
conditions by minimal fairness to the parties. In part III, I use this
proposed theory of warranted direct inference to reconceptualize a
number of the important legal issues involved in the lost chance
cases, and I suggest guidelines for deciding motions for summary
judgment or directed verdict and for framing jury instructions in such
cases. In particular, I suggest that a number of the fairness concerns
that courts have sought to address by modifying the legal concepts of
causation or compensable injury are no longer pressing, once certain
confusions about direct inference have been cleared away. More traditional means of achieving justice are available within lost chance
cases, without tampering with causation or compensable injury.
I. POSSIBLE MEANINGS FOR PROBABILITY STATEMENTS IN THE
LOST CHANCE CASES
In lost chance cases, as in most civil cases, the required findings
about the particular plaintiff need not be made with certainty, but
only on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence. In trying to
explain the meaning of the preponderance standard of proof, most
courts and commentators incorporate some notion of probability. 9 It
is important to understand how this interpretation of the preponderance standard in terms of probability leads courts to the confusions
and fallacies involved in the "bright line rule" discussed above.
First, perhaps all courts regard the preponderance standard as
meaning that the factfinder must decide a factual issue for the party
bearing the burden of persuasion if, but only if, the weight of evidence shows that the proposition espoused by that party is "probable,"
or "probably true." This is sometimes expanded to state that the prop-

19. See, e.g., Fennell, 580 A.2d at 210-14 (holding that "traditional rules of causation"
and preponderance standard require proof that "it is more probable than not that defendant's
act caused" the injury); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 103-04 (Ohio
1971) (stating that "probability" in standard of proof is "most ofteo defined as that which is
more likely than not").
One reason for turning to "probability" is to focus the jury's attention on the quality
of the evidence presented in the case. The jury should be concerned with evaluating the
quality of the evidence, not just the "simple volume of evidence or number of witnesses," 2
KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339, at 438 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; see FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL.. CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 7.14, at 339 (4th ed. 1992). The jury should also determine the extent to which the evidence presented deserves to be believed, and not simply rely on their private subjective
"hunches" and preconceived notions.
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osition must be found to be "more probable" than its negation.20

This first level of interpretation considers probability as an ordinal
concept (allowing an ordering of alternatives as "more probable" and
"less probable"), but not one that is fully quantitative.2'
A number of courts have gone further, however, and have interpreted or explained the meaning of preponderance on a second level,

using the quantitative terminology of mathematical probability. These
courts have held that a "preponderance" of evidence means having a

probability of truth greater than 0.5, or having a "greater than 50%
chance" of being true.' This position considers the mathematical
calculus of probability as an appropriate model for what is meant in

20. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 339, at 439 ("[t]he most
acceptable meaning . . . seems to be proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of
the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence"); Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of the "Naked Statistical
Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1991) (acknowledging that "the conventional
conception of civil trials involves comparing the probability of a plaintiffs case to its negation"). I assume here this conventional view that the comparison is between the probable
truth of the proposition and the probable truth of its negation, and do not engage in the
discussion of whether this conventional view is incorrect. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 425-31 (1986) (discussing a system
of comparing the probabilities of the accounts of the parties, not a proposition with its negation) [hereinafter Civil Trials].
21. For a discussion of the distinction between ordinal variables and scalar or fully
quantitative variables, see Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy
of Scientific Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CONN. L. REV. 567, 577-78 (1991). While
ordinal variables rank or order the things to be classified by reference to an increase of the
property under consideration, scalar variables are fully quantitative in the sense that they
classify by some quantitative measure of incremental frequency, degree or amount of the
relevant property.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 55-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); Cooper v. Hartman, 533
A.2d 1294, 1299-300 (Md. 1987) (holding that plaintiff must prove patient "had a better than
50% chance of full recovery absent the malpractice"; "probability" means "greater than 50%
chance" and "possibility" is "less than 50% chance"); Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103-04 ("probable" in connection with standard of proof "is more than 50% of actual"); Sir Richard
Eggleston, The Probability Debate, 1980 CRIM. L. REv. 678, 680; David Kaye, The Limits of
the Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 487, 493 ("Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, all that is required is that the probability in question exceed 1/2"); Glanville
Williams, The Mathematics of Proof-, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 297, 297, 303; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 335, 336-39 (1971)
(proposing that the jury must find "probabilities, not facts": "the need is only to form an
actual belief as to the balance of probability-that is, a belief as to which side enjoys the
50%+ advantage"); cf Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 589-92 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing without distinction the traditional rule of "probability" as "more likely than not"
caused by defendant and a "not-better-than-even chance" of survival absent negligence).
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the law by "probability." The probabilities to be determined by the
jury can be compared in a fully quantified or cardinal way, and not
merely ordinallyY
Courts that use this fully quantitative interpretation might then
conclude, as a corollary, that if the baseline risk of the plaintiff's
injury is greater than the defendant-caused risk, then the defendantcaused risk must be less than 0.5 or 50%, and the defendant should
be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.24 Thus, when faced with
a lost chance case and a baseline risk greater than 50%, the court
might grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment or directed
verdict, giving as a reason the legal insufficiency of the plaintiff's
evidence. It does so because it concludes that any reasonable jury
must infer that probably (with probability greater than 0.5) the patient
died due to the pre-existing condition, not the defendant's negligence."
Each of these steps seems reasonable. The aggregate result, however, can be devastating to plaintiffs and can create a systematic
windfall to negligent defendants in the lost chance cases. This prospect has led to the judicial quandary about what justice requires in
these cases. One goal of this Article is to show exactly where and
how the above chain of reasoning goes astray. Briefly, I propose that
the first and second levels of interpretation can be fruitful provided
the probability statements about specific plaintiffs are interpreted
subjectively and as imposing minimal fairness constraints on
factfinding. I will argue, however, that the third step, the further
inference to the 50%-baseline-risk rule, is invalid as a "bright line
rule," although under certain conditions a sufficiently strong direct
inference might be warranted. But before moving to these conclusions, which I argue for in part III, a conceptual foundation must be

23. See, e.g., Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104 (stating that under the standard of proof in
civil cases, "'[it is legally and logically impossible for it to be probable that a fact exists,
and at the same time probable that it does not exist') (quoting Davis v. Guarnieri, 15 N.E.
350, 361 (Ohio 1887)). For example, a proposition with a probability of 0.6 is twice as
probable as a statement with a probability of 0.3. The mathematical calculus of probability is
discussed below, see infra part II.B.1.
24. See cases cited supra note 17.
25. E.g., Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 211, 214 (Md. 1990)
(refusing to create a "new tort" allowing full recovery for causing death by causing a loss of
"less than 50% chance" of survival); Cooper, 533 A.2d at 1299-300 (."[p]robability exists
when there is more evidence in favor of a proposition than against it (a greater than 50%
chance that a future consequence will occur)') (quoting Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983)).
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laid by surveying the types of probability statements found in the lost
chance cases, the mathematical calculus of probability used to interpret the meaning of those statements, and the major competing interpretations of that calculus.
A.

Uses of Probability in Lost Chance Cases

Before addressing possible meanings that might be given to the
terms "probable" and "probability," it is important to appreciate several different uses of the terms in the lost chance cases. In this part,
therefore, I describe several types of uses, all of which are intricately
involved in lost chance cases. The objective here is largely
definitional, merely setting forth distinctions that will be useful in the
ensuing discussion.
1. The Probable Truth of Propositions and Propositions About
Event Probability
Determining the probability of a proposition's being true is one
of the principal tasks of the finder of fact. A typical example from
the lost chance cases is the proposition that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's death. This is an "ultimate issue of fact"
to be determined by the jury, but it can also be the subject of expert
opinion. Any proposition about events such as causation can be said
to have a probability of being true or false.
While all propositions can be said to have a probability of being
true, not all propositions are about the probability of events occurring.
An example of the latter is when, in a lost chance case, an expert
witness testifies that a person in a situation similar to that of the
plaintiff at the time of the misdiagnosis has a 61% chance (0.61
probability) of not surviving beyond 5 years, even with accurate
diagnosis and normal treatment. The expert is making a statement
about the probability of events. The probability of the event is logically distinct from the probability of the proposition's being true or
false.26 For example, a proposition that some event occurs 90% of
26. Some epistemologists prefer to talk about "physical probabilities" and "epistemic
probabilities." See, e.g., JOHN L. POLLOCK, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 96
(1986). "Physical probabilities" are said to be about "the structure of the physical world," to
be "independent of knowledge or opinion," "discovered by observing relative frequencies,"
and "the subject matter of much of statistics." Id. "Epistemic probabilities," by contrast, are
about propositions (not observable events) and purport to measure their "degree of justification." Id. It seems to me, however, that talking about the probability of a statement being
true and the probability asserted within the statement's content makes the relevant distinction
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the time might have a very low probability of being true.2 ' As
should become clear, overlooking this distinction may be part of the
problem behind the tendency to develop a "bright line rule" of 50%.
2. Probabilistic, Statistical and Categorical Content
The content of statements can be probabilistic (e.g., "the probability that the plaintiff's cancer was caused by the defendant's act is
0.7"), statistical (e.g., "50% of people exposed to that amount of
radiation develop skin cancer"), or categorical (e.g., "the defendant's
negligence caused the plaintiff's cancer"). Statements about probabilities make assertions either about the probability of events or about
the probability of a proposition's being true, as discussed in the previous subsection. Statements with statistical content take as their
subjects or predicates statistical concepts-such as percentages, proportions, means, or statistical associations (e.g., correlation).28 Categorical statements, for present purposes, take as both their subjects
and predicates concepts that are neither statistical concepts nor probabilities.29 Moreover, to reiterate the point made in the previous subsection, the probability of a proposition's being true is logically distinct from its content-whether that content is probabilistic, statistical,
or categorical.

without the unneeded suggestion that there are two kinds of "probability." There is no reason
at this point to assume that we need different interpretations of probability simply to accommodate these two uses.
Moreover, I will talk about the probability of "truth" of the proposition, as opposed to
its degree of "justification," simply because the former is more common and intuitive, and
because this Article is not the place to try to make or use that important epistemological
distinction. For a discussion of this distinction and its importance, see id. at 7-10.
27. Assertions about the probability of the truth of statements might be made by expert
witnesses as well as by the jury (such assertions are usually deemed to be implicit in the
jury's verdict). On the other hand, statements about the probability of events are usually
made only as part of the evidence itself.
28. By "statistical concepts", I mean the rather open-ended set of descriptive and inferential concepts being developed in the field of statistics to address such problems as data description, sampling, and modeling. For a discussion of statistical concepts related to measurement, sampling, and modeling uncertainty, see Walker, supra note 21, at 580-608.
29. The typical kind of categorical statement is one using concepts that scientists would
consider "qualitative" or "nominal" variables. For a discussion of different kinds of variables,
see Walker, supra note 21, at 574-80. My goal is not to define these categories in any rigorous way, because that is unnecessary here. My present objective is merely to underscore that
the evidentiary statements found in lost chance cases come in at least three varieties that are
worth distinguishing on the basis of their content.
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3. Generic and Specific Propositions
A third important distinction is that between generic and specific
propositions. This distinction is based on the subjects of the propositions: "generic" propositions are about groups or classes of objects,
while "specific" propositions are about particular individuals.3" Propositions about certain types of people (for example, those with a cer-

tain kind of pre-existing cancer) are generic, while propositions about
the particular plaintiff in the particular case are specific.3
With respect to causation determinations in tort cases, the evidence usually includes both kinds of propositions: specific statements
about the causes of the particular plaintiff's specific injury, as well as
generic statements about the classes or types of individuals relevant to
the plaintiff's case (such as the class of persons who have the same
kind of injury as the plaintiff or who have been exposed to the same
type of negligent act as the plaintiff). Moreover, the law requires the
jury to reach a determination about the causes of the specific
plaintiff's injury ("specific causation"),32 not merely about the types

30. Some epistemologists prefer the terminology of "definite probabilities" and "indefinite
probabilities" to make the same distinction as "specific" and "generic" propositions, respectively. See, e.g., POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 97. Pollock clearly has the same distinction in
mind, however
Definite probabilities are the probabilities that particular propositions are true or
that particular states of affairs obtain. Indefinite probabilities, on the other hand,
concern concepts or classes or properties rather than propositions. We can talk
about the indefinite probability of a smoker contracting lung cancer. This is not
about any particular smoker-it is about the class of all smokers, or about the
property of being a smoker and its relationship to the property of contracting lung
cancer.
Id.
31. This distinction is shown by the symbols used in traditional predicate logic to model
the two kinds of propositions. Individual things (usually represented by lower-case letters
from the beginning of the alphabet-a, b, c) can be the subject of specific predication: for
example, "Jones has cancer and was misdiagnosed" might be symbolized by "Ca & Ma," in
which "C" represents the predicate " . . . has cancer" and "M" represents " . . . was misdiagnosed." Generic predications are about things that are not identified specifically other than
by the predicates or class names actually used in the proposition, and are represented by
lower-case letters from the end of the alphabet-x, y, z. For example, "if anyone had cancer,
then she was misdiagnosed" would be normally represented by "(Vx)(Cx : Mx)" and "at
least one person had cancer and was misdiagnosed" by "(3x)(Cx & Mx)." E.g., MARK
SAINSBURY, LOGICAL FOnis: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 141-47 (1991).
32. The jury must try to determine the actual cause of the specific plaintiff's injury.
E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1234, 1238, 1261-63
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); cf,
e.g., V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 807, 810 (1961) (distinguishing data about classes of coins and information about a
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of causes generally associated with the relevant class of persons ("generic causation").33
There is relatively little difficulty in interpreting the meaning of
a generic statistical statement that 61% of persons in the plaintiff's
situation would not survive 5 years, or even in understanding a generic probability statement that the probability of survival for people in
those circumstances is 0.61. There is, however, considerably more
difficulty in interpreting. the statement that the probability for the
specific plaintiff is 0.61. This latter problem of interpretation or
meaning will be discussed below in part II.B.
4. Types of Substantive Uncertainty Underlying Causation
Statements about causation-whether those statements are
probabilistic, statistical, or categorical in content, and whether they are
about classes of individuals or specific persons-possess many types
of inherent uncertainty, which are usually impossible to eliminate. I
have elsewhere initiated a taxonomy of such types of inherent uncertainty, identifying six logically distinct types: conceptual, measurement, sampling, modeling, causal, and epistemic uncertainties.' Scientists who study causation (e.g., epidemiologists or toxicologists) use
statistical and other methodological techniques to try to reduce these
types of uncertainty as much as possible. The residual amount of
each type of uncertainty associated with any particular causation statement will depend upon the content of the statement itself and its supporting evidence.
It is reasonable to assume that the probability of truth of a causal determination in litigation is a function of the types and amounts
of residual uncertainty associated with its supporting evidentiary statements. An adequate substantive theory of evidence (in contrast to the
procedural evidence familiar to most attorneys) would provide guidance on how a probability should be assigned to an ultimate determination on the basis of that evidence." Such a substantive theory of
particular member of a class).
33. Expert opinions about causation can also be classified as opinions either about "specific causation" (the causation actually at work in the plaintiff's particular case) or about
"generic causation" (the capability to cause effects in certain persons, such as the potential of
a certain chemical to cause damage to genetic material in humans).
34. Walker, supra note 21.
35. The legal literature addressing issues involved in such a substantive theory of evidence has grown geometrically over the last 25 years and includes most of the debate over

the use of Bayes' Theorem by judges or juries. Representative of this stream of literature is:
L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); Ronald J. Allen, The
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evidence would respect methodological differences in particular types
of scientific proof, would integrate specific categorical evidence and
generic statistical evidence, would incorporate theories of statistical
inference, and would provide a theory for combining probabilities for
underlying evidence into a probability for the ultimate determination.
However, such a substantive theory of evidence is well beyond the
scope of this Article. As I discuss the meaning of probability state-

ments and later propose a theory for warranted direct inference involving probability statements, I do so with the recognition that there

are many kinds of underlying uncertainty, not all of which are obviously quantifiable. I must simply assume, for purposes of the discus-

sion in this Article, that it is possible rationally to assign probability
values to factual determinations on the basis of uncertain evidence. I
believe that my conclusions in this Article do not depend in any way
upon the adoption of any particular theory about how ultimate probabilities should be derived from evidence-with the exception of the

direct inference itself, discussed at length in part I.

Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 373 (1991); Allen, Civil Trials, supra note
20, at 405-15 (comparing conventional views of probability with conventional views of trials);
Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673 (1986)
(arguing inability of Bayesian reasoning to accommodate second-order propositions about
evidence); Craig R. Callen, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Comment on Professor
Allen's Theory, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 423 (1991) (commenting on Allen's story model and
well-specified case approach); L. Jonathan Cohen, The Logic of Proof, 1980 CRIM. L. REV.
91 (discussing Pascalian and Baconian inference rules); Eggleston, supra note 22, at 682-87
(discussing problems with combining probabilities on multiple issues); David L. Faigman &
AJ. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of
Statistical Evidence, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 1 (1988) (finding that study results indicated
individual jurors would generally underutilize statistical information as compared to qualitative
information); Stephen E. Fienberg, Gatecrashers, Blue Buses, and the Bayesian Representation
of Legal Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 693 (1986) (critiquing Brilmayer's arguments against use
of Bayesian reasoning); Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach
to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1970); Edward Gejuoy, The Relevance of
Probability Theory to Problems of Relevance, 18 JURIMEMRICS J. 1, 9-28 (1977) (discussing
the usefulness of Bayes' Theorem in computing probabilities); John Kaplan, Decision Theory
and the Factflnding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1083-91 (1968) (determining probabilities using Bayes' Theorem); David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasherand Other Stories,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101; D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange
Cases of Paternity Testing, 75 IowA L. REv. 75 (1989) (discussing the admissibility of expert testimony on probabilities in paternity cases and critiquing judicial reasoning employing
statistics in those cases); Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 439 (1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971); Glanville Williams,
The Mathematics of Proof-l, 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 340, 340-50 (addressing multiple issues
and the applicability of the multiplication rule); Anne W. Martin, Comment, 66 B.U. L. REv.
709 (1986) (critiquing Brilmayer's arguments that Bayesian methods are incomplete).
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B. Andlyzing the Meaning of Probability Statements

As I discussed in the previous subsection, "probability statements" come in various types. Some are statements about the probability of a proposition's being true-whether the content of that proposition is probabilistic, statistical, or categorical, and whether the sub-

ject of that proposition is a generic class or a specific individual. In
addition, some are statements about the probability of an event occurring, and in these statements the concept of probability is predicated

about events, not propositions. All of these types of "probability
statements" play important roles in the lost chance cases. In this part,

I lay out alternative theories of meaning for these various types of
probability statements, and provide the foundation for the argument in
part I that the direct inference central to lost chance reasoning employs more than one interpretation of probability.

1. The Formal Meaning: Satisfying the Probability Calculus
The "probability calculus" is an axiom system intended to capture the formal meaning of probability statements.36 That calculus is
36. In the terms of the probability calculus, the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being statements of probability are that the propositions asserted satisfy three axioms
of the probability calculus. See, e.g., COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, ScIENTtFc REASONING: THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 13-19 (1989); POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 98; Lea Brilmayer
& Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CH. L. REV.
116, 136-37 (1978); David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U.
CHI. L. REv. 34, 41 n.28 (1979).
In the formulation that follows, the letters a, b, c stand for particular propositions in
some set of propositions S, the letters x, y, z stand for any unidentified proposition in the
set, and compound propositions can be formed by using the logical connective of disjunction
"x v y," which symbolizes an inclusive "or." Inclusive "or" is truth-functional disjunction,
such that the compound proposition "a v b" is false just if a and b are both false; it is true
if a is true, b is true, or both are true.
The three axioms or requirements can be stated as follows, using the symbol "PR(x)"
to refer to the probability that any proposition x in S is true:
(I)
For every proposition x in S, PR(x) > 0;
(I1)
If x is a tautology, Pr(x) = 1; and
(III)
If x and y are logically inconsistent, then
PR(x v y) = PR(x)+PR(y).
In prose, these requirements are, first, that every proposition must be assigned a probability
that is greater than or equal to zero. Second, if any proposition is a tautology (that is, it is
necessarily true regardless of the facts, such as the proposition that "either sentence x or its
contradictory is true"), then it has a probability of 1. Third, if two propositions are logically
inconsistent (that is, logically incompatible, such that they cannot both be true at the same
time), then the probability of the inclusive disjunction of those two propositions is equal to
the sum of their independent probabilities.
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conventionally used to capture the "formal" meaning or "syntax" of
probability: values assigned to propositions or events are "probabilities" if, and only if, they satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. The axiom system provides a formal calculus defining the proba-

bility

of logically

compound

statements

(such

as

negations,

disjunctions, or conjunctions) as a function of the probabilities of
component statements.37 Numerical values between zero and one that
"behave" as the calculus requires are considered probabilities in what
I referred to earlier as the fully quantitative sense.38

The so-called "unconditional probability" of some proposition x,
symbolized "PR(x)," is the probability that the proposition x is true.

In contrast to "unconditional" probability, the "conditional" probability
for two sentences x and y is the probability that sentence x is true on
the condition that sentence y is true. This is called "the conditional
probability of x given y," and is symbolized "PR(x I y)". 39 When the
concept of conditional probability is joined to the axioms for uncondi-

tional probability, one important and useful theoretical result is Bayes'
Theorem.'

The axioms are formally identical whether the argument values x and y are taken as
referring to propositions (as above) or events (as in set theoretic formulations). HowsON &
URBACH, supra at 17-19; see HENRY E. KYBURG, JR., PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC
11-14 (1970).
37. For an explanation of the logical connective of disjunction, see supra note 36. A
truth-functional negation, symbolized "-x," is true only when the argument proposition x is
false, and false only when x is true. Logical conjunction, symbolized "x & y," is true only
when both x and y are true.
38. See supra text accompanying note 23.
39. This notation can be introduced as a definition:
PR(X Iy) =of PR(x & y) / PR(y).
E.g., David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1470

(1979); see HoWsON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 16.
40. The definition given in note 39 provides the basis for Bayes' Theorem by algebraic
transformation, as follows:
PR(x I y) PR(y) = PR(x & y);
since PR(x & y) = PR(y & x),
PR(Xly) PR(y) = PR(yJx) PR(x),

and
PR(x I y) = (PR(y lx) PR(x)) / PR(y).
Bayes' Theorem can then be stated as:

For PR(x), PR(y) > 0,
PR(X Iy) = (PR(y Ix) PR(x)) / PR(y).
See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTI ATIVE METHODS IN LAW 87-89 (1978); HOwSON

& URBACH, supra note 36, at 26; KYBURG, supra note 36, at 19-20.
When we are interested in defining the probability of one proposition as a function of
the probability of its negation, a more useful formulation of Bayes' Theorem is the following:
For PR(x), PR(y) > 0,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:247

When these axioms, definitions and theorems are added to the
calculus of truth-functional logic, 4' this expanded calculus can be
used to model the formal structure of both the probabilities of statements' being true and the probabilities within the content of statements. The reason is that the same formal calculus can be interpreted
either as referring to propositions (probabilities take propositions as
arguments) or to types of events (probabilities are predicated' of
events).42 For example, a generic proposition "a" that an event of
type E has a probability of occurrence of 0.8 might be symbolized
PR(E)=0.8. This particular proposition might itself have only a 0.2
probability of being true (PR(a)=0.2). Writing out the full symbolism
displays the distinction between the probability of the statement and
the embedded statement about probability: "PR("PR(E)=0.8")=0.2."I
will assume, however, that both probabilities in this expression are
probabilities precisely because they both satisfy the same formal calculus.
2. Objectivist Interpretations of Probability Statements
It is one thing to acknowledge the formal syntactical requirement
that in order for a set of values to be probabilities, at least in a full
quantitative sense, the values must satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. It is yet another thing to interpret or give meaning to
statements about probabilities concretely in terms of human experience. The question is what we mean when we make assertions about
unconditional or conditional probabilities. The primary contending
theories today are "objectivist" ("realist" or "physicalist") interpreta-

PR(x Iy) =

PR(y Ix) PR(x)
(PR(y Ix) PR(x)) + (PR(y I-x) PR(-x)).
This formulation follows from the axioms since x and -x are logically inconsistent and yet
one of them must be true. See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN, supra at 88-89; HowsON & URBACH,
supra note 36, at 26 (stating general form); Brilmayer & Komhauser, supra note 36, at 137;
Richard 0. Lmpert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1022-23 & n.12 (1977).
In the lost chance cases, x might be the proposition that the plaintiff's injury is a
defendant-caused injury and -x the proposition that ,the plaintiff's injury is a baseline injury.
Evidence presented in the litigation might be represented by the proposition y. Then one
might characterize the task of the factfinder as determining PR(x Iy). An excursion into the
usefulness of using Bayes' Theorem to model (either descriptively or normatively) the
probabilistic inference in lost chance cases is not the topic of this Article, although Bayes'
Theorem might play a role in a substantive theory of evidence. See discussion supra part
II.A.4
41. For a general discussion of such a unified system, see, for example. SAINSBURY,
supra note 31, at 103-32.
42. See supra note 36.
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tions and "subjectivist" ("idealist" or "personalist") interpretations of
probability statements. The distinction being made is between theories
that claim that statements about probabilities refer to "objective"
features, characteristics, or laws of observable events themselves, and
theories that such statements refer to "subjective" states of mind, such
as degrees of belief or degrees of uncertainty.4 3
A leading example of an objectivist interpretation is the theory
offered by von Mises." In that theory, a probability is the limit of
the frequency of occurrence of a specified type of outcome event
(such as throwing a "6" on a die) relative to the total number of
repeated trials of a repeatable event (such as throwing the die), as the
number of such repeated trials goes to infinity. On this analysis,
observed relative frequencies are not themselves probabilities, nor are
they always good estimates of probabilities. In one series of throws
of a die, the relative frequency of throwing a "6" might be 93 out of
600, in another series 109 out of 600, or even 134 out of 600. If
relative frequencies were themselves probabilities, each finite sequence
of trials would have its own set of probabilities and not the repeatable event as such. But if the causal factors influencing the outcome
of the throw remain the same, an objectivist expects the probability
(that is, the limit value of the relative frequency) to remain the same
over many finite trial sequences. If the repeatable event itself does
not change in character, its probability characteristics should not
change either.
It is entirely possible, of course, that the relative frequencies
calculated for a number of observed sequences of trials will not converge toward a single limit, and therefore will not yield a stable
probability. In von Mises' terminology, a repeatable event can have
associated probabilities only if the sequences of observed trials from
the repeatable event is a "collective."45 A "collective" is an infinite

43. See, e.g., HowSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 39-76, 201-34; POLLOCK, supra
note 26, at 96-114; Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing
Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 252-53 (1990); see also L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY 47-70 (1989).
44. HowsON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 202-13; see RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 1-29 (Hilda Geiringer ed., 2d rev. Eng. ed., Macmillan Co.
1957) (1928).
45. HOwSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 203-08; VON MISES, supra note 44, at 2425. Probabilities necessarily refer to some collective, and the unqualified term "probability"
was always intended by von Mises to mean "the probability of that attribute [type of possible
outcome] within the given collective." VON MISES, supra note 44, at 29.
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series of potential outcomes' that satisfies two conditions or axioms:
the Axioms of Convergence and Randomness. The Axiom of Convergence requires that some definite limiting value actually exists for the
relative frequency of interest in the series.4 7 The Axiom of Randomness requires that limiting value to be the same for any infinite
subsequence selected from the infinite series by some method executable in advance.4" Therefore, on von Mises' analysis, a statement
about probabilities does not merely describe the relative frequencies
of events observed to date, but asserts something beyond the observable-namely, that the reference event (used to specify the denominator) and the outcome event (used to specify the numerator) must be
sufficiently identified, repeatable and predictable that they can be
regarded as generating a collective.
Such objectivist interpretations based on relative frequency
(which I will refer to simply as "frequentist" interpretations) do seem
to capture one of our main intuitions about the meaning of generic
probabilistic propositions about observable and repeatable events,
such as statements about the probability of throwing a "6" with a die.
A fundamental feature of lost chance cases, however, is that the jury
must determine not only whether some incidence of defendant-caused
injuries would be expected for persons similarly situated to the plaintiff ("generic causation"), but also the probability that the particular
plaintiff's injury was defendant-caused ("specific causation"). But if
probability statements are interpreted only as referring to limits of
relative frequencies in an indefinite number of trials of a repeatable
experiment, then in what sense could probabilities be predicated about
single, unique events, such as the plaintiff's injury?
Some frequency theorists like von Mises have held that probability statements are never meaningful with reference to particular events
or occurrences.4 9 The only possible meaning in such cases is the

46. The series has been described by von Mises either as an infinite sequence of potential outcomes or as a finite sequence of actual outcomes which would satisfy the Axiom
of Convergence if indefinitely extended. HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 204-06.
47. HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 204-05; VON MiSEs, supra note 44, at 1215, 24. In "[a] collective appropriate for the application of the theory of probability," the
relative frequencies must "become more and more stable as the number of observations is
increased" and they must possess "limiting values." VON MisEs, supra note 44, at 12, 24.
48. HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 205-08; VON MISS, supra note 44, at 2329 (calling this requirement "the Principle of the Impossibility of a Gambling System": the
limit of the relative frequency of throwing a "double 6" with two dice, for example, remains
the same even if we bet on only every second throw).
49. Von Mises was very careful and clear on this point:
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indirect and vague one that if the particular occurrence were repeated
a large number of times and if the series of outcomes were to be a
subsequence of a von Mises collective, then the probability would be
the limit of the relative frequency of occurrence in that collective."
By contrast, "propensity" interpretations of probability statements
have attempted to address this problem of unique events." On a propensity theory, a statement of probability asserts that there is a repeatable experiment under consideration that has some set of objective
physical characteristics or features ("propensities") which in the long
run would produce stable, limiting relative frequencies of possible
outcomes, provided the experiment were continued indefinitely under
similar conditions.5" Part of the meaning of a probability statement
on this interpretation is that some causal system is at work that
would produce a series of outcomes that would be a "collective" (in
von Mises' sense) if continued indefinitely. Propensity theorists would
seem to have the advantage of proposing that specific probability
statements do make sense after all, because they are really assertions
about the underlying propensities physically in the specific individual
or situation. 3
There are several major problems with using either of these
frequentist theories in lost chance cases to interpret probabilities about
the plaintiff's particular situation. First, either explanation of meaning
depends necessarily on the notion of repeating the reference situation
(the circumstances leading to the plaintiff's injury event) a large
number of times. Both the von Mises theory and the propensity theory assume that we can make sense of the notion of repeating the

When we speak of 'the probability of death,' the exact meaning of this expression
can be defined in the following way only. We must not think of an individual, but
of a certain class as a whole, e.g., 'all insured men forty-one years old living in a
given country and not engaged in certain dangerous occupations.' A probability of
death is attached to this class of men or to another class that can be defined in a
similar way. We can say nothing about the probability of death of an individual
even if we know his condition of life and health in detail. The phrase 'probability
of death' when it refers to a single person, has no meaning at all for us.
VON MISES, supra note 44, at 11.
50. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 32, at 811-13.
51. HOwsON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 221-25 (discussing Popper's theory). On
propensity theories generally, see COHEN, supra note 43, at 53-58; KYBURG, supra note 36,
at 46-50; JOHN L. POLLOCK, NoMIc PROBABILtTY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTION 2332 (1990); cf POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 96-97, 105 (considering "propensities" as "physical
probabilities").
52. HOwsON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 221.
53. COHEN, supra note 43, at 55-56; HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 221-22.
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injury-causing situation. However, this seems contrary to our intended
meaning in making the probability statement. When we make the
probability statement, we are not making any claim about a hypothetical "thought experiment," nor do we intend that anyone "run" such a
thought experiment in order to assess the truth of any probability
statement. When the jury is told to determine whether the plaintiff's
injury was probably defendant-caused, as opposed to baseline, they
are not being invited to sit back, close their eyes, imaginatively run
an indefinitely long sequence of similar reference situations, and
(mentally) "observe" the relative frequency of outcomes. In fact,
running such a thought experiment in one's head would be a sign
that he or she did not understand the intended meaning of the probability statement. In short, this theory of meaning does not square with
our experience, and any hypothetical thought experiment is probably a
fiction invented merely to save the frequentist theory of probability
when it is applied to statements describing particular events.'
A second set of objections is based on the premise that the idea
of repeating a unique event is itself flawed. The theory cannot mean
repeating exactly or precisely the same unique event with all of its
causal determinants. If this were the event to be repeated, and if the
world in which the law works is even roughly deterministic, then
each repetition would have the same outcome as the original event,
and the relative frequency of the original outcome would always
approach L" Instead, what would have to be meant is that the repetitions would be of the "same" event in the sense that certain (probably unspecified) causal factors are identical throughout the series of
repetitions, but not so many causal factors as to predetermine the
outcome of each trial.56 However, this criterion of "sameness" used
to define the repeatable or reference event must not be an objective
characteristic of the event, but a subset of causal factors chosen for
the purpose of determining the probability. This choice of defining
factors for "sameness" introduces a subjective feature of probabilities
that many objectivist theorists would want to avoid, because the value
of the associated probability is no longer a function merely of objective features of the events themselves, but must vary with each choice

54. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1066 ("It is meaningless to speak of the probability
of the defendant's guilt in terms of the number of times he would be guilty in an infinite
number of exactly similar cases.
55. Id.
56. For a similar argument addressed to Popper's theory of propensities, see HOWSON &
URBACH, supra note 36, at 223.
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of descriptors used to identify the "same" event.5 7

Of course, frequency theorists such as von Mises might not be
troubled by either of these objections, if they consider probability
statements simply inapplicable to unique or particular events. However, if they so limit the scope of meaningful probability statements,
their theory leaves many normal uses in a legal context without any
interpretation. Legal theorists, concerned with evaluating the probabilities of many statements about particular, unique events, are understandably skeptical about the usefulness of an interpretation that either
distorts the normal meaning of probability statements or leaves essen-

tial uses undefined. 8 Moreover, there is no reason to accept such
distortions in meaning if, as I argue below, there is no compensating

conceptual gain in dealing with legal problems.
In my theory of warranted direct inference, there is an important
place for generic probability statements with a frequentist interpretation, when they are properly placed in harness with other probability
statements and interpretations. The strength of a frequentist theory is
that it addresses our intuition that the best way to infer probabilities
is from observed frequencies of occurrence. By using a frequentist
interpretation for precisely those evidentiary statements for which the
theory is appropriate, I intend to take advantage of this strength, even
though such a theory will not account for all of the types of probabil-

ity statements used in the law.

57. This objection might be made to any frequentist interpretation, even of generic statements, because a criterion of "sameness" is essential for describing any "repeatable event,"
which is necessary for defining any limit value of relative frequency. This would not be an
objection to the frequentist analysis as such, however, but to characterizing it as entirely
"objective." A frequentist might well concede that probability values are inherently a function
of how we choose to define classes of events, but insist that once the reference or repeatable
event is defined by some specification of "similarity" or "sameness," the relative frequency of
occurrence of a possible outcome is still an objectively determinable characteristic of the
sequence of outcomes. See, e.g., VON MISes, supra note 44, at 17-18. The "subjectivity"
introduced by the need to define the reference event is quite different from a subjectivist
theory that probability statements merely refer to an individual's degree of belief.
58. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (1985); Kaye, The Paradox
of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, supra note 35, at 105; Kaye, supra note 36, at 41-47;
Tribe, supra note 35, at 1346-49. But see Ball, supra note 32, at 810-13 (arguing that although probabilities are about frequencies and not directly about individuals, "there is no
question that behind every relevancy statement is a proposition which casts human experience
into frequency form").
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3. Subjectivist Interpretations of Probability Statements
Subjectivist interpretations of probability statements often take
such statements as referring not to observable events, but to a "degree
of belief' or "degree of confidence" in the truth of the statement.59
On such an interpretation, even probabilities that seem to be about
events are really indicators of our strength of belief about those
events.
An immediate difficulty for subjectivist theories is explaining
how an individual's degrees of belief would necessarily satisfy the
axioms of the probability calculus. A person's degrees of belief in the
truth of propositions considered one at a time are not necessarily
going to (or perhaps even likely to) have the" logical properties required of probabilities. In other words, subjective degrees of belief
might not satisfy the probability calculus. One approach to this problem has been to eschew actual subjective beliefs of individuals, and
to turn instead to the "degree of belief' that a "rational person"
would hold.' If criteria for rationality can be formulated such that
the degrees of belief of this ideal "rational person" would necessarily
satisfy the probability calculus, then "rational degrees of belief'
would be probabilities. Probability statements could be interpreted as
referring to the degrees of belief that such a "rational person" would
have.
A recent variation on this approach has been presented by
Howson and Urbach. 1 They suggest that probabilities can be interpreted as a reasonable person's estimate of a "fair betting quotient"
for a proposition. A "betting quotient" is an algebraic transform of
the "betting odds" that could be placed on the truth of a proposition. 2 The betting odds on the truth of a proposition is the ratio of

59. See generally sources cited supra note 43.
60. E.g., LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 7-8, 19-21 (2d ed.
1972) (discussing that probability postulates "can be regarded as a logic-like criterion of
consistency," and behavior at variance with the theory is handled as one would a "slip in
logic," to be explained in psychological terms).
61. HOwSON & URBACH, supra note 36.
62. The betting odds on a proposition do not satisfy the probability calculus because

they do not range from 0 to 1, but rather from 0 to infinity. Probabilities can be derived
from odds, however, by the function PR = fQ / (I + Q), where PR is the probability and Q
is the odds. Id. at 58.
This formula provides a one-to-one mapping of odds onto probabilities, with odds of
zero being equal to a probability of zero, odds of 1:1 (equal odds) being equal to a probability of 1/2 (since 1/2 = (1/1) / 1 + (1/1)), and odds of infinity being equal to a probability
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the amount the bettor would lose if the proposition proves to be false,
divided by the amount the bettor would win if the proposition is true.
A "fair" betting quotient is one for which it could not be determined,
in advance of learning whether the proposition is in fact true or false,
whether any bettor at those betting odds would necessarily enjoy an
advantage at winning or losing money.63 A "fair" betting quotient
eliminates any a priori or necessary advantage to betting either for or
against the truth of the proposition.

The claim is that betting quotients that are "fair" in this sense
are in fact probabilities-that is, they satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. Any set of betting quotients assigned by an individual,
in order to be fair betting quotients, must satisfy the probability calculus, because if the axioms are violated, then a net advantage will
follow necessarily for some bettor, independently of whether the
betting quotients are correctly set and independently of the truth or
falsehood of the propositions involved.' If someone were to con-

of 1, as shown in the following illustrations:
Odds (fl)
Probability (= 2 / I + Q)
0
-4
0
3:1000
3/1003
1:2

--

1/3
11/2

2:1

-

2/3

1000:3

-

1000/1003

1:1

The quantity "2 / (I + 02)" is referred to as the "betting quotient."
If someone judges the proposition to be very probable, she should set the odds on the
proposition so that a proportionately small payoff would follow if the proposition proves in
fact to be true. Thus, we commonly say, when commenting on a highly probable proposition,
that "odds are that . . . ," meaning that the odds are in favor of the proposition being true.
If the individual judges the proposition to be improbable, then the odds on the proposition
should produce a high payoff should the proposition (contrary to expectations) prove to be
true. Thus, the odds set by an individual on the truth of a proposition would be related to
her assessment of the probability of truth. The appropriate betting odds would ideally balance
out the risk taken in wagering, so that a reasonable person wishing to place a bet should be
indifferent to wagering for or against the proposition.
On odds-setting generally, see, for example, VICKI ABT Er AL., THE BUSINESS OF
RISK: COMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA 39-44, 68-77 (1985); REUVEN
BRENNER & GABRIELLE A. BRENNER, GAMBLING AND SPECULATION: A THEORY, A HISTORY,
AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN DECISIONS 144-48 (1990).
63. It is not important whether or not an individual asserting a probability is at all
interested in actually wagering on the truth of the proposition, for the individual functions in
this context as a fairness judge or regulator, not as a bettor.
64. Details of the argument can be found at HoWSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 5963. Given a betting quotient associated with odds f2, on proposition x, it can be deduced
that the fair betting quotient on its negation -x must be I minus the betting quotient for x,
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struct such an "unfair" set of betting quotients and somehow require
two persons to place bets on opposite sides of the entire set, the betting proposal would be "biased" because it would be certain in ad-

vance that one bettor or the other must stand to lose money. It is
possible, therefore, to interpret a set of subjective betting quotients as
probabilitiesprovided that they are in fact fair in this particular sense.
To avoid confusion with other concepts of fairness, I will refer to
such betting quotients as being "minimally fair."'65 In this Article, I

will adopt the Howson and Urbach account for a subjectivist interpretation of probability statements, and will use the phrase "subjective
probability" to mean a betting quotient that is minimally fair.

The sense in which a fair betting quotient is "subjective" has
now taken on a distinctly intersubjective meaning. An individual's
subjective betting quotients are fair only if they adhere to the proba-

bility axioms, and they cannot be set merely by the subjective whim
in order for the betting quotients on both x and -x to be fair. In terms of probabilities, if
PR is the probability of x, then I minus PR must be the probability of -x. If any probability
other than I-PR were to be assigned to -x, say PR', then we can be certain that the set of
betting quotients PR and PR' is not fair, for betting on or against the set will necessarily
produce a net advantage or disadvantage regardless of the truth of x. For example, if PR =
2/3 (with odds of 2:1) and PR' = 1/4 (odds of 1:3), then a reasonable person would conelude that a bet on the pair of propositions x and -x at those odds will necessarily have an
advantage regardless of whether it is x or -x that is true. If x is true and -x false, the
bettor will gain 1 unit bet on x and lose 1 unit bet on -x. But if -x is true, the bettor will
gain 3 units on -x and lose only 2 units on x. Thus, the bettor cannot lose money and can
only gain money on the bet. The betting quotients on the pair are a priori favorable to a bet
on the pair. Therefore, in order for the betting quotients on both a proposition and its negation to be fair, they must be set in accord with the probability calculus.
Similarly, for any second betting quotient associated with odds Df on a second proposition y, it can be deduced that, if x and y are mutually inconsistent, the subjectively fair
odds on "x v y" must be the sum of the betting quotients for x and y. It can be demonstrated, although I do not reproduce the proof here, that if the third axiom of the probability
calculus is not satisfied, then the subjective odds for x, y and "x v y" cannot all be fair. A
wager on or against all of these three propositions must necessarily produce a net advantage
for some bettor, regardless of whether x and y prove to be true or false.
65. By "minimally fair," I mean fair only in the sense that the set of betting quotients
is unbiased, and the probability calculus is satisfied. Other notions of fairness are not intended. Also, a set of betting quotients can be minimally fair without being the correct betting
quotients or probabilities, see supra notes 62-63.
A somewhat analogous but psychological argument for why bettors themselves should
prudently adhere to the probability calculus is based on their presumed desire to avoid having
a "Dutch book" made against them. See generally COHEN, supra note 43, at 59-60; HOWSON
& UP.BACH, supra note 36, at 71-73. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 99-100; BRIAN SKYRMS,
CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC 168-98 (2d ed. 1975). The
argument made here for holding jurors to a standard of minimal fairness is not based on
such a psychological argument. It is based on the fairness argument that jurors should not be
allowed to make a Dutch book against any party.
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of the individual. Presumably, if the individual were reasonable, this
conclusion that betting quotients must be probabilities in order to be
fair could be demonstrated to her satisfaction. However, whether or
not she is in fact reasonable, and whether or not she considers those
axioms to express minimal conditions of fairness, is beside the
point.66 Rather, reasonable persons should be able to agree that her
subjective betting quotients must satisfy the probability calculus or
they are not all fair. Assuming, that is, that we are reasonable persons, we should reach this conclusion about her subjective betting
quotients.
This situation is no different than that encountered with the
axioms of deductive logic. An individual may or may not draw logically valid inferences from her premises, but reasonable persons
should be able to agree about which of those inferences are to be
regarded as valid and which are not. An individual's efforts to draw
valid inferences do not guarantee that she will do so. Deductive logic
provides a theory of valid inferences, not a psychological prediction
about a given individual's actual reasoning patterns. Likewise, the
probability calculus provides a theory of minimal conditions for the
fairness of betting quotients, and thus for subjective probabilities,
regardless of its merit as a descriptive theory of a given individual's
actual patterns of reasoning.
This comparison of the probability calculus to deductive logic
suggests a further analogy. Deductive logic provides a theory about
which inferences from premises are valid, but not about which conclusions are sound or which premises are true.67 For example, if
someone believes that there are exactly four aces in a certain deck of
playing cards, and that only one of them is drawn out and not replaced, then a valid inference deduced from these premises is that
three of the remaining cards must be aces. But deductive logic does
not tell us whether these premises and this conclusion are true. The
theory of deductive logic, in other words, does not tell us that there
were in fact four aces originally in that particular deck. Similarly, if
someone's subjective probability (fair subjective betting quotient) for
a proposition is 0.8, then the probability calculus allows us to deduce
that, if her betting quotients are to be in fact fair, then her subjective
probability for the negation of that proposition must be 0.2 (that is, 1
minus the probability of the original proposition). This conclusion fol-

66. See HowsON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 273-74.
67. See, e.g., SAINSBURY, supra note 31, at 23-25.
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lows simply from our decision to require the person's betting quotients to be minimally fair. However, our determination to maintain
minimal fairness (in the form of the probability calculus) does not
ensure that 0.8 is in fact the correct betting quotient, setting the
appropriate fair odds that adequately balance the risk in betting on the
particular proposition. The correctness of a betting quotient (as opposed to its minimal fairness) depends on the content of the proposition, the substantive evidence, and the true state of affairs, not just on
satisfaction of the probability calculus.
I will argue that the principle of fairness to all parties requires
that jury determinations of the likelihood of truth of factual propositions must satisfy the probability calculus. Unless the subjective betting quotients for a set of logically related factual propositions satisfy
the axioms of the probability calculus, we can be certain-in advance
and independently of the truth or falsehood of any of the particular
propositions themselves-that the set produces a net bias for or
against some party. Put another way, if the set of betting quotients
for the factual determinations needed in order to reach a general
verdict does not satisfy the probability calculus, then that set of determinations must be biased against some party. All parties to the litigation, however, should be entitled to have the jury reach a set of conclusions that is minimally fair in the sense that no one party will be
automatically and systematically disadvantaged, regardless of the truth
of the allegations at issue.
A set of factual determinations with biased odds, if wagered
upon indifferently, would necessarily produce a net advantage or
disadvantage for some wagerer. The opposing parties in a litigation
are necessarily in the position of the "wagerers," in the sense that one
of them will "win" the lawsuit and the other will bear the cost of the
injury at issue in the suit.' If one were to decide whether the jury
had found the facts correctly, such a decision might be based on
intuitions or on the evidence presented at trial or on information not
available to the jury. Such a decision is very different from deciding
that the findings are minimally fair. Minimal fairness is a matter of
satisfying the probability calculus. The set of betting quotients assigned to the findings should be minimally fair in the sense that one

68. There is no need here to delve into the complexities of comparative fault, partial
damages, and other ways a jury can effect a compromise judgment. For simplicity of analysis, I will assume that either one side or the other "wins" the case and that the other side

bears the cost of the injury.
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can decide, independently of deciding the truth or falsehood of the
findings, that a wager in favor of one party or another will not have
a necessary advantage or disadvantage. If there is an inspection of
only the betting quotients themselves, the reasonable bettor should be
indifferent about betting on either side in the case.
The judicial system routinely places minimal constraints of logical consistency on jury determinations of fact. When judges do not
allow logically inconsistent verdicts to stand, they are in fact requiring jury determinations to comply with the requirements for valid
deductive inference. I argue that judges should go further and should
require the factual determinations of a jury to be internally coherent
as well, in the limited sense of satisfying the additional axioms of
probability theory.' In so doing, judges would be increasing only
modestly the formal requirements of reasonableness for factfinders.
A number of objections have been raised against any subjectivist
interpretation of probability that draws upon betting concepts. First, it
has been argued that this approach confuses "rationality" with "prudence." It might not be prudent to bet on a set of propositions whose
odds are "loaded" against you, but it does not follow that doing so is
irrational in any epistemological sense.7" If my goal here were to
analyze an epistemological concept of "justified belief' I might agree
with this objection, but the lost chance cases in law present a different situation. I have argued above that it is important for the law to
require jurors to be minimally fair to the litigating parties. This approach merely requires jurors to be fair setters of betting quotients,
not to be bettors themselves, and this makes this objection irrelevant.
The law imposes minimal fairness constraints on jurors not because it
demands that verdicts be epistemologically rational, but for distinct
policy reasons of its own.7' When the law requires juries to be minimally fair to the litigating parties, this in fact imposes the requirement that the jury's subjectively assigned betting quotients (degrees of
belief) satisfy the probability calculus (be probabilities). Juries do not
69. It may be that judges intuitively enforce the constraints of the probability calculus
in any event. See supra note 23.
70. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 99-100.
71. A similar response is appropriate to the objection that, when faced with a compli-

cated set of propositions or bets, a reasonable person may in fact bet into a Dutch book. See
POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 100. Subjective probabilities need not be descriptive about how
people actually set betting quotients: the claim is not that they always do so fairly. My argument is simply that the judicial system should hold jurors to minimal standards of fairness
whenever it comes to the judge's attention that the jury has in fact made a Dutch book
against some party to the litigation.
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have to be bettors; they simply have to be minimally fair factfinders.
A second objection to subjective probabilities is that there is no
reason to think that, for any specific case, there is a unique degree of
belief that is rational. It does seem likely, this objection continues,
that there would be such a unique degree of rational belief "in any
fixed epistemic setting," given a fixed body of evidence.72 If a factual proposition has a probability of being true, then that probability
cannot be interpreted subjectively.
There are a couple of responses to such an objection. One is to
point out once again that, while uniqueness might be a sensible requirement for an interpretation or theory of rationality,
epistemological rationality is not the task before us in the lost chance
cases. When we are required to adjudicate a case in the face of residual baseline risk, perhaps the least we can hope to achieve is minimal
fairness, and, in addition, coming as close as the evidence and human
reasoning will allow to the "correct" determinations of fact. It would
be neither surprising nor of great legal concern if being minimally
fair would not itself guarantee that there exists a unique probability
for every proposition in a given evidentiary situation.73
Another response to this objection is that the subjective interpretation" of probability statements that I will use here is an analysis
based on minimal fairness, and does not guarantee the correctness of
the betting quotients set or the factual determinations made. Satisfaction of the probability calculus does not generate a probability of
truth for an isolated proposition. It merely imposes constraints on
assignments of probability to groups of logically related propositions.74 Thus, requiring minimal fairness of a jury will not constrain
ile jury to arrive at any unique determinations about probabilities.
The jury is still free to set the probabilities (the fair betting quotients)
as the jurors believe warranted. The requirement of fairness is just the
minimal one that the jury must not bias the set of determinations a

72. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 101.
73. It may be that the desire to know that a unique probability is warranted in any
given situation is one aspect of "objectivity" that a subjective interpretation relinquishes, even
when the "subject" is a hypothetical "rational person." It might be unsettling to an
epistemologist that a theory of rationality would not guarantee a unique line of reasoning
from a given set of evidentiary premises to a unique probability for a conclusion, but this is
unlikely to be unsettling to jurists, for whom rationality constraints are generally minimalist
and do not determine a unique solution. To jurists, a "rational determination" is usually one
over which "reasonable minds may differ."
74. See supra notes 64-65. For example, ifPR(x) is 0.8. then PR(-x) must be 0.2. However, the theory of probability itself does not entail that PR(x) must be 0.8.
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priori against any party.'
A major advantage of this subjectivist interpretation should be
emphasized. Subjectivist theories, unlike some objectivist theories,
have no difficulty giving an interpretation to probability statements
about unique events. A probability statement stating a fair betting
quotient reflects the factfinder's degree of belief in the truth of the
proposition presented, not an estimate of the relative frequency of
outcomes in hypothetical thought experiments. Therefore the difficulties encountered by a frequentist interpretation are avoided altogether.
The requirement of minimal fairness does place certain constraints on sets of logically connected probability assignments, thus
imposing some "intersubjective" criteria on factfinders. But one might
be inclined to think, at this point in the analysis, that requiring jury
determinations to be subjective probabilities (minimally fair betting
quotients) is itself a minimally fruitful development. How does this
conceptual move help us resolve the paradox of baseline risk presented in the lost chance cases? In the next part, I develop the perhaps
surprising result that in certain situations involving residual baseline
risk, such as the lost chance cases, the requirement of minimal fairness alone can compel some fairly concrete assignments of subjective
probability to factual determinations. When certain requirements of
warranted direct inference are satisfied, minimal fairness compels a
specific assignment of subjective probability to the individual case.
I.

WARRANTED DIRECT INFERENCE IN THE LOST CHANCE CASES

In the lost chance cases, most courts agree that, unless there is a
rethinking of traditional concepts of causation or compensable injury,
or an overriding social policy established, they should decide cases
against the plaintiff as a matter of law whenever the percentage of
baseline cases relative to reference situation cases is greater than

75. The conception of avoiding a priori bias against any party with a set of probabilities assigned to propositions, see supra notes 64-65, allows me to present an analysis about
verdict outcomes without first having an adequate theory for how to arrive at single probabilities for propositions on the basis of evidence, or for combining probabilities from subsidiary
propositions into a single probability for the conclusion. In other words, the argument here is
not predicated on having a complete theory of probabilistic inference, such as Bayesian theorists are trying to construct, or a complete theory of substantive evidence. See supra part
H.A.4 and note 35. The minimal requirement here is that, whatever the set of propositions
and probabilities adopted by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented, arriving at a
verdict must not be accomplished on the basis of a set that is, as a set, a Dutch book
against some party.
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50%.76 They also agree that when defendant-caused injuries are a
greater percentage than baseline injuries in the reference situation, a
verdict for plaintiffs can be readily defended. Implicit in all of this
reasoning is the assumption that the ratio of defendant-caused cases
to baseline cases is a direct determinant of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injury.
I argue in this part that this underlying assumption must be
analyzed more carefully, and that in its simplest form it is incorrect. I
present an analysis of exactly how the generic statistical evidence is
logically related to, and capable of supporting, the ultimate statement
of probability about specific causation. Specifically, the problem is
deciding when it is warranted to conclude proposition "C":
There is a probability of S1100 that this specific plaintiff's injury of
(C)
type I is a defendant-caused injury,
on the basis of the propositions "A" and "B":
This specific plaintiff is characterized by risk factors {Cl, C2.....
Cn}; and

(A)

Out of the class of persons characterized by risk factors {C1,
C2 ..... CJ, an estimated S% would suffer injury I as a result of
the defendant's negligence (i.e., S% would suffer defendant-caused
(B)
injuries).'
In propositions A and B, the circumstances referred to as "Ct,
C2, .....
Cn" are those known characteristics of the plaintiff (e.g.,
genetic predisposition, pre-existing colon cancer) that are also known
risk factors for an injury of type I (e.g., death from colon cancer).
That set also includes the defendant's negligent act, which is an established risk factor. The "reference situation" is, by definition, those
Cn} plus any other risk factors for
known risk factors {C, C2 .....
injury I that are in fact present in the plaintiffs case, whether those
risk factors are known or not. Thus, {C , C2, ... I Cn} is usually a
subset of a larger set of risk factors (known and unknown) that char-

76. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
77. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 12-14, the premise B is
derivable in the typical lost chance case from statistics available for those diagnosed correctly
at time t, and for those diagnosed correctly at time t2, with the delay from t, to t2 being
attributed to the misdiagnosis of the plaintiff's condition by the defendant at t,. In the more
general case involving residual baseline risk, such as a toxic tort case, there may be more
uncertainty associated with estimating the percentage of defendant-caused injuries in the reference situation.
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acterizes the entire reference situation.
The problem of "direct inference" addressed in this part of the
Article is this: under what conditions is the specific, categorical proposition C justifiably inferred from propositions A and B?" Such direct inference is central to the judicial reasoning in the lost chance
cases in that courts assume that whenever the S% in proposition B is
greater than 50%, C is inferable with a probability greater than 0.5.
They also usually assume that whenever S% is equal to or less than
50%, inferring C is not justified. In other words, they assume that
proposition C is generally or always inferable from A and B alone. I
will argue that this simple reasoning is invalid. Before setting out my
affirmative account of direct inference, however, I will examine and
reject several theories of warrant for direct inference.
A. Reasoning Based on Random Selection of Plaintiffs
One might think that using the relative frequency of defendantcaused cases to baseline cases to derive proposition C can be justified
because the plaintiff can be treated as though she were a case chosen
at random from the population of reference situation cases. 9 This
rationale conceptualizes the direct inference problem as though one
were drawing a ball from an urn containing known percentages of red
balls (defendant-caused cases) and blue balls (baseline cases). Recasting proposition C along these lines, we have the question: "What is
the probability that the plaintiff we have in court has been drawn
from the defendant-caused class of cases?"
Adopting this model, the reasoning is as follows. If a ball is
drawn from the urn using a simple random procedure, then, by definition, every ball in the urn has an equal chance of being drawn.'c

78. The problem addressed in this Article is not the difficult one of how to identify or
characterize the "narrowest reference class about which one has adequate statistics," Henry E.
Kyburg, Jr., The Reference Class, 50 PHiL. OF Sci. 374, 377 (1983) (paraphrasing
Reichenbach's famous formulation), but rather how to justify using any such reference class
in the lost chance cases, assuming that some acceptable reference class can be identified
through the litigation process.
79. The need for additional assumptions to make a valid inference has been recognized
before. George James argued that the reasoning "[n]ine-tenths of all As are X, B is an A,
therefore the chances are nine to one that B is X' is not logically valid "except upon the
assumption that As may be treated as a uniform class with respect to the probability of their
being X." George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REv. 689, 697
(1941). While it is uncertain what precise meaning to give to James' additional assumption,
he clearly recognized that there is a logical gap to be closed.
80. E.g., ViLt.M L. HAYS, STATISTICS 52-53 (4th ed. 1988).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:247

Using such a selection procedure, the probability of drawing a red
ball is identical to the proportion of red balls in the urn." This
thinking might be transferred to the lost chance cases, by reasoning
that because S% of the reference situation cases are defendant-caused
cases and because this plaintiff was drawn in a simple random fashion from the reference situation cases, the probability of the plaintiff
being a defendant-caused case is S1100. 2 This reasoning is appealing
because it allows a direct translation of generic statistics (e.g., S% =
61%) into probabilities for specific causation (0.61). The reasoning is
of interest to judges because it seems to sanction a direct and compelling inference ("as a matter of law") from a high baseline risk
(e.g., 80%) to a high probability that the plaintiff's injury was not
defendant-caused (0.8).
This "simple random draw" model, therefore, leads to the thesis
that C is derivable from A and B on the basis of the additional
premise "R":
The specific plaintiff was selected from the set of all those persons
in the relevant reference situation by means of some simple random
(R)
process.
The central importance of this premise should be clear. The information about the selection process becomes the critical basis for warranting the inference. If I neither know nor assume anything about
the process by which a ball is selected from the urn, I would have no
rational basis for translating the percentage of red balls in the urn
into a probability that the one actually drawn is red. For example, a
selection process that involved inspecting the color of the ball before
drawing it and purposely drawing two blue balls for every red one
would defeat any such inference.
As a theory to explain legal reasoning in the lost chance cases,

81. This reasoning typically favors an objectivist interpretation of probability statements.
in which the drawing and replacing of balls is the repeatable experiment. See supra part
ll.B.2.
82. This reasoning is somewhat related in its strategy to the "principle of indifference"
in the classical theory of probability. That principle was a default rule for assigning probabilities to mutually exclusive but exhaustive types of events. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 4347; HOwsON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 40-42; KRiSTIN S. SHRADER-FRECHETrE, RISK
AND RATIONALrrY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 112-16 (1991).

Even if that principle is extended to assigning probabilities to groups, however, that is not
the problem of direct inference. Direct inference assumes that statistics can somehow be derived for groups (usually empirically), and addresses the inference from those group statistics
to the individual case.
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however, an analysis based on a simple random plaintiff-selection
model is suspect for several reasons. First, it represents a conceptual
shift away from the specific causation problem of how the particular
plaintiff's injury was caused, toward the selection issue of how this
particular plaintiff emerged as a plaintiff from those in the reference
situation. These are generally assumed to be very different issues: the
first has traditional causal significance, while the second is much
more tangential to the litigation. It is at least surprising to be told
that when we inquire about the likelihood of specific causation, we
really are inquiring about any bias inherent in the selection process
(usually a self-selection process) by which an injured patient decided
to bring a lawsuit. We thought we were inquiring about how the
plaintiff became injured, not about how an injured person became a
plaintiff.
Second, by focusing on the process of selecting persons from the
reference situation to be plaintiffs in lawsuits, this model is probably
conceptualizing the process by which this plaintiff was selected as a
repeatable event, with the probability of drawing an instance of a
defendant-caused injury being understood on a frequentist interpretation. This conceptualization is subtly inherent in the model of drawing
a ball from the urn: when we imagine this activity we imagine a
repeatable event, with probabilities interpreted in terms of relative
frequency of "success." However, the objections to applying
frequentist interpretations of probability statements to unique events,
discussed above, are just as applicable to any attempt to conceptualize
the particular plaintiffs selection as a "random draw" from the pool
of persons in the reference situation. 3
A third reason for rejecting a random plaintiff-selection theory as
inadequate is that if it is true, then a relevant issue in the lawsuit
should be whether the plaintiff-selection process over-selects or underselects defendant-caused cases. On such a theory, an important factual
element of the plaintiffs prima facie case should be the proposition
that the process leading to the plaintiff's decision to sue was an unbiased one with respect to any risk factors for the injury I, whether
known or unknown.' Whether the decision by a particular plaintiff

83. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58. We intuitively object that we are not
interested in a hypothetical plaintiff drawn at random but in ihe actual status of this particular plaintiff. And we think that this particular plaintiffs injury either was caused by this
defendant's negligence or was not.
84. Any known risk factors would be included in [C,, C2.
C,, would presumably
be the subject of evidence presented in the case, and should be taken into account in deter-
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to sue was unbiased with respect to the injury outcome would become an issue of fact in the case. Psychological factors, for example,
might influence the decision to bring a lawsuit and might also correlate with survival prospects from the underlying disease: an aggressive, combative attitude toward life might correlate both with willingness to sue and the ability to survive cancer. Economic factors such
as significant wealth might also correlate both with suing and with
survival (through financial ability to afford better medical care).
The point I wish to make is not that a trial in a lost chance case
should include consideration of such psychological, economic or other
factors. My point is rather that a plaintiff-selection theory requires a
determination that the selection process was in fact random and unbiased. It is not sufficient that we are merely ignorant of any bias.
What the model requires in order to warrant direct inference from A
and B to C is knowledge of lack of bias in selection, not lack of
knowledge of selection bias. In fact, I reject the plaintiff-selection
theory in part because I do not think that establishing such unbiased
self-selection should be an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
A fourth objection to the random plaintiff-selection model is that
it obscures the true relevance of the percentage of defendant-caused
cases. On the random selection model, it is irrelevant what process
led to the proportion of red and blue balls in the urn: the entire force
of the reasoning derives from the process of selection from the urn,
not any process of coloration or of being placed into the urn. This
model counterintuitively eliminates even the relevance of the very
underlying causation that we thought was crucial. However, I believe
that the causal system at work in the reference situation is surely
relevant to adjudicating the particular plaintiffs case. It seems utterly
peculiar that such relevance would be entirely replaced by an inquiry
into whether the plaintiff's self-selection to be a plaintiff approximated a random draw.
A final concern with the random-draw model is that it relies for
its persuasive force upon a mental image that is especially misleading
with respect to the lost chance cases. The random plaintiff-selection
model is dependent upon a mental image of drawing balls from an
urn, a picture with typically the following features: (1) we can deter-

mining both the reference situation and the percentage of defendant-caused cases. For example, the plaintiff's stage of colon cancer at t,, as well as the plaintiff's family history of
cancer, might affect survival rates at t,, and therefore the percentage of defendant-caused
cases.
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mine the color of any ball by means of a perceptual process that is
epistemologically independent of the selection process (that is, a ball's
color can be determined regardless of how the ball was drawn); (2)
we can determine the true percentage of red balls in the urn, at least
in principle, by complete enumeration (without sampling); and (3) we
can compare the results of any sampling process (the sample) with
the true value of the population in the urn, so that any bias in the
selection or sampling process can be determined. If these are typical
features associated with our mental picture of drawing balls from an
urn, it is important to appreciate that none of these features applies in
a lost chance case (let alone in the more general case involving residual baseline risk).
In a lost chance case, there is usually no alternative factfinding
process other than that used in the litigation by which we can determine whether a given person's injury is defendant-caused or baseline.
If there were such a method, we would use it as evidence in the
litigation, and we would not have the problem posed by the lost
chance cases. The problem of what to do in the face of residual
baseline risk is a problem precisely because there is no known independent method for deciding how to classify any particular case.
Moreover, the population in a lost chance case ("those in the reference situation") is hypothetical and not finite, and we can usually
observe only occasional actual cases. Finally, we can never independently assess the accuracy or bias of the plaintiff-selection process.
We will never be able to prove, even in principle, that the selection
process by which this plaintiff came to the court is an unbiased one,
relative to the type of injury. Therefore, with so many features not in
common between ball-drawing and plaintiff-selecting, the mental
picture of drawing balls from an urn is a misleading abstraction that
is of limited relevance to the lost chance cases.
Taken together, these considerations constitute persuasive reasons
for not adopting a plaintiff-selection rationale for direct inference in
the lost chance cases.s We must look elsewhere for the logical

85. If one were to pursue the ball-from-urn analogy, in a lost chance case it is as
though we are handed a single ball concealed in a box (so its color cannot be independently
determined); we are told that the ball is chosen from an urn in which approximately S% of
the balls were red, but we are not told how this particular ball was chosen from that urn;
and we are instructed to award damages if, but only if, the ball is red. Most people would
consider it unwarranted, I believe, simply to assume that the ball-selection process was a
truly random one. Moreover, we do not really care about how the ball was drawn, but rather
about the process leading to this particular ball having the color it has.
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bridge needed to conclude proposition C from propositions A and B.
B. Pollock's Theory of Direct Inference Based on Nomic
Probabilities

An alternative approach to warranting direct inference is to find
the basic rationale in the objective world, using an objective interpre-

tation of probability. Such a theory has been put forward by John
Pollock, who rejects at least certain versions of subjective probability.86 Pollock distinguishes between "indefinite probabilities," which
are probabilities about classes or properties of individuals, and "definite" or "single case probabilities," which are probabilities that partic-

ular states of affairs obtain. Examples of indefinite probabilities are
the probability of a smoker getting lung cancer or the probability of
its raining "when we are confronted with a low pressure system of a

certain sort,"' while examples of definite probabilities are "the probability that Jones will get cancer" or "the probability that it will rain
tomorrow.""8 Direct inference involves the logical movement from
indefinite probabilities to definite probabilities.89

Pollock's account of justified direct inference' posits two principal preconditions. The first is that the indefinite probability from
which the definite probability is derived must be a "nomic probabili-

ty"-not merely a statistical generalization, but a "law" about "physically possible objects" that supports counterfactual assertions about
what would be the case in alternative possible worlds. 9 Thus, the

foundation for the direct inference must be a statistical law that holds
86. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 97-103. "I regard the entire theory of subjective probability as being pervasively confused, turning upon a conflation of epistemic and prudential
rationality." l at 102. Pollock was not, however, considering the fairness formulation presented here, and I do not consider the reasons for his rejection compelling as against the
Howson and Urbach formulation. Moreover, I consider his "objectivist" explanation of the
meaning of probability statements in terms of proportions in physically possible worlds to
carry unnecessary ontological baggage. POLLOCK, supra note 51, at 45-48. Pollock himself
seems to regard his ontology as dispensable in some sense. Id. at 74. Regardless of the ontology adopted, it is noteworthy that his account of our intuitions about direct inference reinforces the analysis I propose in this Article.
87. POLLOCK, supra note 51, at 21.
88. Id. at 21-22.
89. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 103-05; POLLOCK, supra note 51, at 109.
90. Pollock's analysis arrives not at the truth of the definite probability, but at a "prima
facie reason" for believing the truth of the definite probability. POLLOCK, supra note 51, at
77-79. The inference is a reasonable one in the absence of conflicting information, but it is
possible to later obtain conflicting information that will render the inference unreasonable.
91. See id. at 32-38, 42-43, 81-86, 132-40.
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across all possible worlds. Moreover, the definite probability that is
the conclusion of the direct inference must also be lawlike. A definite
probability about the proportion of times that a certain die would roll
a four might be a nomic probability because of our extensive knowledge of the relevant physical structure of that die.' The nomic probability expresses an "average" of events for that die across all possible worlds, and we might state our conclusions in terms of the propensities of the particular die involved.93 A direct inference to a conclusion about a particular thing is warranted in part by the lawlike
nature of the statistical evidence.
The second logical condition for direct inference is that it must
take into account all of the warranted beliefs about the specific individual that are relevant to determining the probability.94 Pollock refers to this as the "total evidence" requirement.95 Our direct inference to the probability in the specific individual's case is justified
only if we intend to take into account, and do in fact take into account, everything relevant aboit that specific individual that we are
warranted in believing.96 A warranted proposition is one that we
"would become justified in believing" if we were "ideal reasoners. '97
Pollock's objectivist theory of direct inference is best understood
as applying to the probabilistic laws of modem physics or to the kind
of chance setup exemplified by a fixed game of chance. We can lay
out the theory in terms familiar from our direct inference problem. If
the generic probability in proposition B expresses a statistical law true
across all physically possible worlds, and if the identifying characteristics {C1 C2, . . CnJ have taken into account all of the properties

92. See id. at 33, 45-46, 115-23. Pollock would apparently deal with the problems with
probability statements about unique and specific individuals by interpreting the statements to
be about proportions obtaining in all "possible worlds" in which the specific individual occurs. See id. at 133-34. I am not here adopting any semantics of possible worlds.

93. See id. at 23-32, 267-78.
94. POLLOCK, supra note 26, at 104; POLLOCK, supra note 51, at 133-34. When we
simply assert the definite probability statement (my proposition C), we are in effect asserting
a "mixed physical/epistemic probability reflecting both the relevant nomic probabilities and
our warranted beliefs about the object" of the probability statement. POLLOCK, supra note 51,
at 132.
95. See POLLOCK, supra note 51, at 133.
96. Pollock precisely defines the concept of a "warranted" proposition. A proposition is
warranted for someone if he could, "through reasoning proceeding exclusively from the propositions he is objectively justified in believing," (1) become justified in believing the proposition, and (2) his justification could not be defeated in the long run by reasoning proceeding
exclusively from other propositions he is justified in believing. See id. at 87.
97. Id.
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of the specific individual relevant to affecting that generic probability,
then we are warranted in making the direct inference to proposition
C. If new information subsequently arises that leads us to revise our
estimate S%, then the conclusion of the direct inference can be revised accordingly.
Although Pollock's theory of direct inference may be useful
when dealing with relatively simple closed physical systems and gambling devices, there are serious drawbacks to using it in the lost
chance cases. The requirement that the indefinite probability on which
the inference is based (the generic statistic S% in proposition B) must
be "nomic" and a "statistical law" will hardly ever be met in lost
chance cases. Our knowledge of risk factors for most diseases is
primitive at best, and few would venture to consider our provisional
estimates of risk to be statistical laws. Even for the few diseases and
risk factors for which our confidence in our risk estimates is fairly
high, we have very little confidence in our estimates of integrated
risks due to combinations of risk factors. This is true in general, let
alone for the particular values for those risk factors possessed by the
particular plaintiff. Even the combined risk of lung cancer from cigarette smoking and asbestos inhalation is difficult to assess, let alone
integrated risks for diseases less well studied. Our knowledge of the
risk factors at work in the particular reference situation is hardly ever
going to approach the level of being lawlike."
Pollock's second requirement of "total evidence" also poses
severe difficulties. It is a heavy burden to require that we take into
account in the direct inference all information about the particular
plaintiff that we are warranted in believing, in Pollock's strong sense
of "warrant."" We typically know or could find out a great deal of
information about the plaintiff, but our problem is not knowing which
information is relevant to the disease or injury. If we cannot decide
what of what we know is relevant, why should we profess to take
"total evidence" into account? In fact, our usual conviction in lost

98. Pollock acknowledges that two direct inferences based on two independent risk factors might lead to inconsistent probability estimates. Id. at 130, 132-33. In such a case, without additional information, "we are left without an undefeated direct inference to make" since
each risk factor's probability undercuts the other. Id. However, the inability to make any
direct inference in such cases is a major problem for lost chance reasoning, since we may
well have independent and different probabilities of injury given different risk factors, and no
information about the interplay of those factors that will let us decide a single probability
and will warrant a single direct inference.
99. See supra note 96.
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chance cases is that we have not taken all our information into account. But Pollock's theory suggests to us that unless we can make
this claim to using total evidence, then we would be unreasonable in
making the direct inference.
I think that Pollock's theory of direct inference captures more of
the logic of that reasoning than does the plaintiff-selection theory.
Pollock's chief advantage is that he re-orients our attention to the
underlying causal system that produced the injury, and deemphasizes
the process of plaintiff selection. However, he demands too much of
that causal system and of our knowledge of it. In the theory I propose below, I retain reference to this underlying causation, while
cutting back on the demands on our knowledge. The move in the
next part is to harness objective probabilities about such causal systems to a subjective probability conclusion about the particular plaintiff.
C. Howson and Urbach's Minimal FairnessAnalysis of Direct
Inference
Howson and Urbach have proposed their own theory of direct
inference, based on the "Principal Principle" formulated (although
somewhat differently) by David Lewis."° The core rationale is
based on what I call minimal fairness, as follows. If someone believes that a causal system would, if repeated, generate a series of
outcomes that can be characterized by an objective or frequentist
probability, and this were all the information believed by that person
to be relevant and true about the next outcome from that system, then
the only fair betting quotient that can be subjectively assigned to that
next outcome must be equal to the value of the objective probability.
If that person were to assign some other probability, and believed it
to be minimally fair, then she would be asserting that, in her view,
there is no a priori advantage to betting for or against that outcome
on those odds. But by hypothesis she in fact believes that repeated
trials will generate a different frequency of outcome, so she should
believe that setting different odds would be to disadvantage some
bettor a priori.
This is of course a subjective unfairness. She might be mistaken

100. David Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance, 2 STUDIES IN INDUCTIVE
LOGIC AND PROBABILrrY 265-93 (Rudolf Camap & Richard C. Jeffrey eds., 1980), reprinted
in 2 DAVID LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 83-113 (1986).
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about the causal system or about the correct value for the objective
probability. However, given the factfinder's subjective beliefs about
that causal system and about the probabilities thought to describe its
outcomes, minimal fairness requires that person to assign to the next
outcome a subjective probability identical to the value believed to be
the objective frequentist probability. Thus, under the Principal Principle, a subjectively assigned definite probability should sometimes be
governed by beliefs about objective indefinite probabilities, if the
subjective betting quotient is to be minimally fair.
In a lost chance case, a juror might conclude that the causal
system at work in the plaintiff's case (in the reference situation)
would produce defendant-caused injuries with a certain objective
probability. Given this belief, and given no additional information
about the particular plaintiff other than that she was an outcome from
this causal system, then minimal fairness requires the juror to assign
that same probability value to the proposition that the specific plaintiff is a defendant-caused case. This subjective probability assignment
to the particular case is not only warranted but compelled, provided
the juror has the requisite beliefs about the underlying causal system
and that is all the relevant information the juror possesses about the
particular plaintiff. These two preconditions for warranted direct inference must be examined further.
The first condition is that the juror must believe that the causal
system generating the outcomes (injuries) must be random and relatively stable, so that the outcomes can be correctly characterized by a
probability.' The juror must believe, therefore, that there are risk
factors that produce baseline and defendant-caused injuries in a proportion that is sufficiently stable so that it can be characterized as a
probability. Moreover, enough must be known about that system so
that a particular value can be assigned to that probability.
The second condition, which I will refer to as the "sole evidence" requirement, is that all that the juror believes to be relevant
about the specific plaintiff is that the plaintiff is an outcome from
that causal system. This condition is essential for compelling the
inference required by the Principal Principle. If a juror believes that
some characteristic of the particular plaintiff renders that plaintiff
more than merely an outcome of the causal system characterized by

101. Howson and Urbach specify that the outcomes must be a von Mises collective.
HowsoN & URBACH, supra note 36, at 202-20, 227-30. For a discussion of von Mises'
notion of a collective, see supra part II.B.2.
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the objective probability, the juror could (and perhaps should) refuse
to assign that generic probability to the particular case, and would not
be unfair in refusing to do so. For example, if the juror concluded
that the particular plaintiff was not "representative" of the patient
outcomes from the causal process, the juror might assign a different
probability to the particular plaintiff. The Principal Principle sometimes allows us to decide that a betting quotient is not minimally fair,
but if the Principle does not apply, then the fairness of the subjective
probability assignment is simply unresolved.
As applied to lost chance reasoning, this rationale sometimes
allows us to infer a subjectively assigned probability in proposition C
(describing a specific unique event) from a generic objective probability in premise B. Moreover, this result is achieved on the basis of
the same principle of minimal fairness that we used to require subjective odds assignments to satisfy the probability calculus. This is a
powerful yet economical result.
On the other hand, the rationale might be too subjective for legal
purposes. It is not important under this analysis that the factfinder
actually be correct about the causal system, the value of the objectively interpreted probability in proposition. B, or the
representativeness of the particular plaintiff as an outcome from that
system. The Principal Principle only assumes that the finder of fact
has certain beliefs about the causal system and the plaintiff. But the
law is interested in more than internally consistent factual findings.
The lost chance cases would not be problematic if we were willing to
settle for mere subjective consistency. The goals of substantive and
distributive justice, optimal deterrent effect, and optimal allocation of
societal resources all require sufficiently accurate factfinding.1 "
A second weakness of the fairness account is that it applies in
only a narrow subset of cases. The "sole evidence" requirement creates difficulties similar to those raised against Pollock's total evidence
requirement. Jurors typically have a great deal of additional
particularistic information about a specific plaintiff. They do not think
of the plaintiff as merely another outcome of the causal system for
which generic statistics are available. They have additional informa-

102. An inference bridge from objective chances to subjective beliefs is also an
epistemological goal. See HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 36, at 228; 2 LEwIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 100, at 86-87, 90-92. Additional information undercuts the compulsion of the Principal Principle, and leaves the factfinder free to assign the subjective probability on other (so far indeterminate) grounds.
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tion about family history, life experiences, and symptoms that goes
beyond the risk factors addressed in the available studies. The causal
relevance of this additional evidence may be suspected by the jury, or
even thought probable, yet the additional factors were not taken into
account in the scientific study generating the estimated S%. If the
"sole information" requirement is taken seriously, it may be a stumbling block to any widespread use of direct inference in lost chance
cases.
In the next part of this Article, I will weld the objective causal
focus of Pollock's theory to the inference of subjective probability
required by the Principal Principle. With the addition of a more permissive notion of sufficient knowledge about the causal system, the
resulting theory of warranted direct inference will prove useful in
analyzing the lost chance cases.
D. A Proposed Theory of Warrant for Lost Chance Inferences
The logical conditions for "warrant" in law might be different
from those applicable in the sciences. The courts are bound to adjudicate cases, and they in fact always affect the interests and rights of
the parties in the sense that parties must win or lose. In deciding
cases, courts must employ a notion of justification that balances procedural fairness, substantive social policy, morality, and judicial administration, as well as epistemic adequacy. Nevertheless, the legal
interest in epistemic adequacy is strong, for unless factfinding gets the
facts roughly right, there may result a failure to achieve such tort
goals as optimal deterrence and distributive justice. In this Article, I
cannot attempt to articulate a theory of how this balancing of objectives should be made. I likewise leave for another time the general
question of the extent to which a theory of warrant should incorporate, at least implicitly, the competing policy goals at work in the
context in which the inference occurs. Although these tasks are bypassed here, it is important to recognize that the account of direct
inference in which the law is interested probably need not attain a
level of epistemic validity desirable in the sciences.
The lost chance cases are an important species of direct inferences in part because they present situations in which an estimate of the
true percentage of defendant-caused cases in the reference situation
can be made with considerable confidence. 3 We are often confident

103.

See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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that there was some increase in risk due to the defendant's negligence, and that our estimate of the magnitude of that increased risk is
reliable. Thus, we often have considerable confidence in accepting
propositions A and B as true."t° Our confidence in the truth of A
and B can also make the desire to warrant a direct inference even
more compelling. Even if we were to assume in a particular case,
however, that A and B are true, the direct inference problem would
remain: What more should be true or warranted, before the inference
to proposition C is warranted? 5 I suggest that the above review of
Pollock, Howson and Urbach leads to the following conclusions.
First, the reasoning from "minimal fairness" drawn from Howson
and Urbach provides an adequate rationale for inferring a plaintiffspecific probability (in proposition C) from a generic probability
(based on proposition B). The random plaintiff-selection theory is
inadequate because it relies entirely on only one feature of the inference problem (plaintiff selection), and in so doing renders irrelevant
the underlying causal process in which the law is interested. Pollock's
account is unhelpful in its requirements for "total evidence" and "statistical laws"-requirements that are not only imposed on proposition
B, but that impose on the probability assertion in proposition C the
"physical" interpretation of being an estimate of a true proportion of
defendant-caused injuries "averaged" across physically possible
worlds. The "subjectivist" interpretation of minimal fairness allows us
to sidestep these disadvantages, and to ground the move from generic
("objectivist") probability to plaintiff-specific ("subjectivist") probability on the Principal Principle and on a policy of minimal fairness to
the parties.
Second, the legal interest in the objective validity of a generic
probability estimate based on proposition B can be addressed by
placing certain requirements on that proposition. The central goal is to
have the generic percentage S% adequately describe the expected out-

104. Premises A and B are:
This specific plaintiff is characterized by risk factors {Cq, C .

C,);

and
Out of the class of persons characterized by risk factors IC,, q2,.... C,}, an
estimated S% would suffer injury I as a result of the defendant's negligence (i.e.,
S% would suffer defendant-caused injuries).
See supra text accompanying note 77.
105. Conclusion C is as follows:
There is a probability of S/100 that this specific plaintiff's injury of type I is a
defendant-caused injury.
See supra text accompanying note 77.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

(A)

(B)

(C)

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:247

comes of an underlying causal process. This can be achieved by three
sub-requirements on the set of risk factors {C,, C2, . . . . CJ in
proposition B.
The first sub-requirement is that those risk factors that are used
in generating the generic estimate S% of the true percentage of defendant-caused cases in the reference situation (premise B) must be causal factors relative to the injury complained of. The law is not interested in basing the direct inference on an estimated percentage that
reflects mere statistical association. Pollock is correct in thinking that
the direct inference is warranted only if an objective causal system
underlies the estimate of defendant-caused cases. In the lost chance
cases, we should try to understand why the delay in diagnosis would
ordinarily lead to an increase in objective risk. The evidence presented should therefore include sufficient data and theory about causal
mechanisms so that the finder of fact can rule out of consideration
any predicates not causally related to the injury (such as redheadedness). If the probability estimate is based on causal and not
coincidental factors, then proposition B will also warrant
counterfactual claims about the reference situation, and the inferred
proposition C will also (in fairness) warrant counterfactual claims
about the particular plaintiff.
The second sub-requirement is that the members of the set of
risk factors {C1 , C2, . . . , CJ used to identify the reference situation
and to generate the generic statistics in proposition B should be significant risk factors for that injury. Mere causal relevance is not sufficient to ensure that a factor is directly and non-spuriously related to
the injury. 1"6 Including a significant risk factor in the causal model
adds to the predictive power of the model as a whole, and eliminating any significant factor can be expected to alter the estimate S%
itself. Put another way, the set of variables used to estimate the expected percentage of defendant-caused cases in the reference situation
should not contain variables that are merely of marginal or indirect
causal relevance. The set {C,, C2, ... I Cn} should contain only
those factors that make a direct, significant predictive contribution to
the causal model as a whole.
Third, we know that in practice the set {C,, C2, ....
C,} is
usually incomplete. If {C,, C2, . . . , 1 } is the set of risk factors
known to be significant for the plaintiffs type of injury, and whose

106. See, for example, my discussion of "causally spurious correlations" in Walker, supra
note 21, at 613-14, and sources cited therein.
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values are known in the plaintiffs case, there are probably other risk
factors that are unknown but causally significant for the injury, but
which are not included in {C1, C2, ... I CnJ. Medical research is
seldom so advanced that we know all the significant risk factors for a
medical condition. To that extent, the set {C,, C2, ....
CJ} does not
completely specify the true causal model for the injury. The normative ideal toward which we strive, however, is to have a causal model
that precisely covers the significant variables and their values in the
plaintiff's case. This is the point of having the reference situation
defined in terms of the actual risk factors present in the plaintiff's
particular case-not in terms of what studies scientists happen to have
performed. But there are almost certainly causally significant factors
in the particular plaintiff's case that medical science has not studied
and may never study. Moreover, there may be interactive effects of
the specific combinations and levels of significant causal factors in
the plaintiff's case that, if the interactive effects were adequately
studied, would lead to a somewhat different estimate than S%. So in
the lost chance cases, we must face the fact that the causal models
are almost always going to be incomplete.
The law and many human affairs (including, I suspect, even the
medical sciences) need not wait until the best possible estimate of the
true percentage is in hand, before a direct inference is warranted. On
the other hand, the estimate S% has to be "good enough" for the
purpose at hand. How good the estimate needs to be in tort cases is
necessarily a function of balancing competing objectives such as
distributive justice, economic efficiency, and administrative effectiveness. However, we may be able to capture the appropriate level of
confidence in a general fashion by requiring that {C1, C2, ... I Cn}
must be a reasonably complete set of the significant causal factors for
the injury. By this I mean that a reasonable person would conclude,
based on all the evidence produced in the litigation, that the estimate
of S% is unlikely to change substantially as new information about
risk factors arises in the foreseeable future.
This third sub-requirement is of course a pragmatic counterpart
to the "total evidence" requirement of Pollock. I have argued above
that Pollock's requirement of "total evidence" is unnecessary as part
of the meaning of proposition C, as well as impractical as a condition
for its warrant. On the other hand, with respect to Howson and
Urbach, I have argued that a purely subjective evidentiary basis for
direct inference would be unsatisfactory to the law. It is not sufficient-given the legal objectives competing with fairness-that the
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juror merely believes that S% generates the correct probability estimate. In order for the direct inference to be legally useful, S% must
substantially approximate the true percentage of defendant-caused
cases in the reference situation. My proposal attempts to stake out a
middle ground for proposition B. The law's requirement for permitting the direct inference should be that the factfinder must reasonably
conclude, given the evidence, that the set {C, C2, ... I Cn} probably
contains all of the significant and causally relevant risk factors for
the particular plaintiffs injury, such that the estimate S% is expected
to be regarded as substantially accurate for the reasonably foreseeable
future. When the evidence warrants such a conclusion, and the juror
in fact reaches that conclusion, then the juror should draw the conclusion C, if she is being reasonable and minimally fair.
This proposal refocuses the evidentiary core of the direct inference back on the particular plaintiff. It forces the finder of facts to
evaluate the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of the generic
statistics in proposition B with reference to the risk factors actually at
work in the plaintiffs case. It recognizes, however, that a "science of
specific individuals" is inherently unattainable, and that even decent
approximations are often hard to come by. It is the jury's task, in the
face of this problem, to evaluate the validity of the generic causal
model that is actually available, to decide whether it is a "reasonably
good approximation" as a model of the plaintiff's case, and to deal
with the parties on the basis of minimal fairness. One requirement of
minimal fairness is that if that generic model is "good enough," then
the direct inference to proposition C is not only warranted but compelled.
In conclusion, judges faced with lost chance cases have not
adequately analyzed the evidentiary requirements needed to make the
direct inference a reasonable one. I believe that the random plaintiffselection rationale is their intuitive and predominant line of reasoning-although I have argued above that this line of reasoning is clearly inappropriate. What judges need is an epistemologically adequate
yet practically useful theory about when the available evidence justifies a direct inference of proposition C from premises A and B. My
proposal is that such an inference is warranted and compelled whenever the set {C,, C2, . . . , CJ is a reasonably complete set of the
significant and causally relevant risk factors for the plaintiff's injury.
Such a theory, of course, does not resolve all of the evidentiary and
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epistemological problems encountered in lost chance cases,"w let
alone the broader policy questions of fairness, justice, and efficiency.
But the theory does lead to some very interesting solutions to some
issues of law routinely faced by courts in lost chance cases. In the
next part of this Article, I use this theory of warranted direct inference to explore those solutions.
IV. RESOLVING ISSUES OF LAW IN THE LOST CHANCE CASES

The task in this part is to use the proposed theory of warranted
direct inference to resolve some practical legal problems that arise in
the lost chance cases. These problems center on the substantive determinations that the finder of fact should make before making the direct inference, but also include such questions as how a jury should
be instructed, who should bear the burdens of persuasion and production on various sub-issues, and what constitutes sufficient evidence to
permit a jury determination. The proper answers to these questions
can be appreciated only within the context of the proposed theory of
inference based on minimal fairness.
A. The Principle of Minimal Fairness
We are now in a position to step back and consider the fundamental underlying problem presented by the baseline risk paradox,
and in particular by the lost chance cases. The problem of direct
inference is the problem of how to warrant an inferential move from
the generic to the specific, from statistics about groups to probabilities
about individuals, when the predicates being considered are not defined in terms of directly observable properties. That is, when we
cannot warrant the conclusion by directly inspecting the specific individual, how does the generic information create the needed warrant?
The approach that I propose to adopt is the one developed by
Howson and Urbach, using Lewis's "Principal Principle."'' 8 This approach is to interpret the probability assertion about the individual in
"subjectivist" terms, by requiring it to be a fair betting quotient. This
principle of minimal fairness to the litigating parties also warrants

107. This theory does not suggest, for example, how particularistic information about the
plaintiff that is thought to be causally relevant, but which is not taken into account in the
generic statistics, should be incorporated into the definite probability in conclusion C. See
supra part Il.A.4 and note 75.
108. See supra part II.C.
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(and under certain conditions compels) that the numeric value of the
generic probability be adopted as the fair betting quotient for the
individual case. Therefore, the basis for warranted direct inference is
the principle of fair and equal treatment to the parties." The
factfinder is warranted in drawing a conclusion about the probability
that the individual plaintiff is a defendant-caused case because, if
certain conditions on premise B are met, to do otherwise would be to
treat one or another party unfairly.
For the lost chance cases, this fairness rationale constitutes a
fundamental shift. Once courts understand that the specific factfinding
is itself warranted by the fundamental policy of fairness to the parties,
they should feel freer to incorporate additional policy concerns into
their decision making. Some courts have pointed out that the uncertainty about what would have happened in the plaintiff's case was
itself caused by the defendant's negligence. ° They also point out
that in many cases the defendant owed a special duty of care to the
plaintiff due to the physician-patient relationship."' However, once
we realize that the direct inference itself is based on a policy of
minimal fairness to the parties, then it is easier to understand why
this policy of even-handedness might well be modified by additional
considerations of the defendant's role and responsibilities. If my proposed theory of warrant is adopted, it should make more sense that
some defendants relinquish part of their claim to equal treatment
through their actions or a special relationship to the plaintiff.
Of course, the- proposed theory is not confined to lost chance
cases. It applies to any case involving residual baseline risk, and any
case involving direct inference. In many such cases outside the typical
lost chance context, there will be no physician-patient relationship or
other special relationship creating a special duty. Nevertheless, there
may be other policy considerations that can come into play in deciding how tenaciously to hold to the principle of minimal fairness. My
intent here is not to foretell the outcomes of those policy debates, but
to identify them as policy debates, once we understand that direct
inferences are in fact warranted by a policy of fairness.

109. I have also addressed the concern that this subjective approach might render the
entire inference unconstrained by any objective criteria. I have argued that the direct inference
should proceed only if certain conditions on the generic objective statistics have been met.
See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
110. E.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 49-51 (Mich. 1990).
111. E.g., id. at 51-52; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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B. Required Findings and the Burden of Persuasion
According to the theory I am proposing here, direct inferences in
the lost chance cases are inferences to a conclusion about the subjective probability that the particular plaintiffs injury was defendantcaused. Such an inference, with a subjective probability equal to
S/100, is not only warranted, but compelled whenever the finder of
fact concludes that S% is an accurate estimate of the true percentage
of defendant-caused injuries that would be caused to groups of patients similarly situated to the plaintiff (that is, to groups of patients
in the reference situation)."' This conclusion, however, depends upon the proposition that the causal model used to derive that statistical
estimate in fact adequately describes the reference situation, which
will be true provided the set of risk factors {C1, C2, ... , C, is a
reasonably complete set of the significant and causally relevant risk
factors that were in fact at work in the plaintiffs specific case.
Although the underlying rationale for this conclusion has been
given in a theoretical framework in part III above, there is also an
intuitive basis. Unless the factfinder is satisfied that the causal model
used to generate the group statistics is also an adequate model for the
plaintiff's own case, those statistics should not be applied to the
plaintiff's case. Further, if the causal model does in fact adequately
describe the plaintiff's situation, the factfinder is not at liberty to
disregard it. In fairness, the only option open to the factfinder is to
conform her subjective probability (fair betting quotient) to the generic statistics. Thus, the direct inference, under these circumstances, is
not only warranted but compelled." 3
This is not to suggest, of course, that making the required findings needed to warrant the direct inference is an easy matter. It will
not generally be easy to determine that the statistics are based on a"
causal model that takes into account all of the significant and causally
relevant risk factors. Nor will it generally be a simple matter to make
appropriate adjustments in the estimate S% to reflect factors whose

112. Some of the
uncertainty inherent in
part II.A.4. Additional
used to generate the

uncertainty surrounding the value S/100 will be due to ,the types of
any scientific information, much of which is quantifiable. See supra
uncertainty, however, will be due to the possibility that the model
generic statistics in Premise B does not adequately describe the

plaintiff's reference situation.
113. It should be emphasized that this analysis applies to any direct inference in the face
of residual baseline risk, and not merely to lost chance cases.
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relevance has not been scientifically studied. These are difficult tasks
involving treatment of available data, evaluation of study design, and
professional judgment concerning missing data and variables. The
implications of the difficulty of this task for judicial decisions on
motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence will be discussed
in the following subsection of the Article.
I suggest that the traditional requirement that the jury must find
specific causation has been the normal means of communicating to
the jury a rough surrogate for the logical conditions required by my
theory of direct inference. The traditional requirement of specific
causation is that the jury must determine that the defendant's negligent act probably caused the specific injury of the particular plaintiff.
Whether the rationale for this requirement has been fairness to the
defendant or an expectation of effective deterrence, it has seemed
reasonable to require that the defendant's negligent act was in fact a
cause of the plaintiff's injury.
If under traditional instructions the jury has determined in a lost
chance case that the defendant's negligent act was a "but for" condition in bringing about the plaintiffs injury, or at least a "substantial
factor" in the set of jointly sufficient causal factors, then the jury
probably found evidence sufficient to satisfy the logical conditions
under my theory of direct inference. If there is convincing evidence
of traditional specific causation, then there is probably also convincing evidence that the conclusion was based on a causal model that
adequately took into account all the significant causal factors in the
plaintiffs case. I suggest that if the jury can in fact make a finding
of traditional specific causation, then it is probably warranted in making the direct inference necessary to the case. The conclusion is that
the traditional judicial position is consistent with my theory: if there
is specific causation, then there is also warrant for direct inference.
The problem in the lost chance cases has been, of course, precisely this specific causation requirement. The presence of residual
baseline risk means that even after all the available information has
been taken into account, we are left with generic statistics about
groups. This is probably a common situation in toxic tort cases, and
we often face an obvious leap from generic group statistics to the
specific plaintiff. The traditional concept of specific causation provides no conceptual bridge for the chasm, leaving the factfinder to
her intuition that if the statistical estimate of defendant-caused injuries
is "big enough," she should make the leap, and not worry about the
fact that she is guessing. The lost chance cases are so difficult be-
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cause it seems that, although the statistical estimate of defendantcaused injuries is "too low," we should sometimes make the leap to
specific causation, or ignore the traditional requirement of specific
causation.
My analysis provides a conceptual bridge for all cases, regardless
of the size of the statistic. My analysis shows that the inferential leap
is indeed warranted in certain specified circumstances. It also shows
that determining when those circumstances obtain is not an easy
matter in many toxic tort and lost chance cases. Moreover, it leads to
the conclusion that the traditional instruction on specific causation
provides a sufficient but not necessary criterion for when those specified conditions obtain. An inference based on a finding of specific
causation is probably warranted, but it does not follow that the inference is never warranted unless such a finding is possible.
My analysis of direct inference leads to the conclusion that the
traditional instruction on specific causation, while normally a sufficient guarantor of correct results, is unnecessarily strong and unfortunately vague when the factfinder confronts the residual baseline risk
of the lost chance cases. It is unnecessarily strong in multiple factor
cases, when there are significant but non-essential factors contributing
to the total risk. While direct inference may be warranted with respect
to "but for" factors, that does not mean it is never warranted with
respect to factors with less critical contributions. On the other hand,
the traditional specific causation instruction couched in terms of "substantial factor" is unnecessarily vague, in that it provides too little
guidance to a serious factfinder. The substantial factor instruction's
"heart" might be in the right place, but its mind is elsewhere.
My theory provides a clear elaboration of what must be found to
be the case before a direct inference to the specific case is warranted.
It might be more beneficial, at least in such cases, to instruct the jury
more informatively, by telling them that they must find for the plaintiff if they determine that the statistical evidence adequately takes into
account all of the significant causal factors likely to have played a
role in bringing about the plaintiff's injury, and that such evidence
convinces them that "probably" the defendant's negligence was also a
cause of that injury.'

114. I do not wish to argue here that jury instructions should necessarily be revised to
incorporate my theory on warrant, for far more is involved in the design of jury instructions
than I am able to take into account here. Moreover, I have indicated my belief that the
"substantial factor" instruction, while vague and lacking in guidance, might convey sufficient
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There is, however, an extremely important disadvantage to the
traditional conception and instruction on specific causation. With a

single issue of specific causation, it is too easy to continue the traditional approach of placing the entire burden of persuasion on the

plaintiff. One reason for this is that specific causation appears to be a
single, unified determination, without the potential for allocating the

burden of persuasion to more than one party. Another reason is that
specific causation appears to judges to be an issue of stubborn scientific fact. This perception changes dramatically when specific causation is replaced by the set of determinations or sub-issues proposed
by my theory of inference, and the principal policy underwriting the

warrant for direct inference is no longer science but fairness.
One could, of course, adopt my theory of warrant and continue
the traditional allocation of persuasion entirely to the plaintiff. However, there is no longer a clear necessity to do so. The policy of
holding defendants responsible for the uncertainty their negligence has
caused, as well as the policy of holding physicians responsible for the

unreasonable additional risk imposed upon their patients, may lead to
other approaches. One approach would be that once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's negligence was a significant risk factor
for the plaintiff's injury, the defendant must bear the burden of per-

information to be adequate. It may be that the usefulness of my theory is best confined to
judicial findings of fact, judicial rulings on motions, and judicial thinking when devising new
legal concepts and doctrines. Some courts have explicitly rejected converting judicial reasoning into a jury instruction. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605,
615-16 (Ariz. 1984) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 as rule of law for
judge but not jury, and allowing plaintiff's case to go to the jury on expert opinions that did
not quantify plaintiff's lost chance of complete recovery and that characterized plaintiff's
chance absent negligence as one "substantially better" than plaintiff's actual chance; court
refused to instruct jury on § 323, but authorized instructions on only "general principles of
probability and causation" and required the jury to find for defendant unless it found "a
probability that defendant's negligence was a cause of plaintiff's injury").
I do believe, however, that more informative and precise jury instructions are possible,
if the courts wish to create them. I suggest, for example, the following language, which
manifests a split allocation of the burden of persuasion between plaintiff and defendant that
will be discussed in the text:
Even if you find that the defendant acted negligently, the defendant is still not liable unless that negligence proximately caused this plaintiff's injury. If the plaintiff
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's negligence significantly increased the risk of the plaintiff's injury, then you should find that the
plaintiff's injury was in fact proximately caused by that negligence, unless the
defendant proves that most people in the plaintiff's situation who suffered the same
injury would have done so in any case, whether the defendant had acted negligently or not.
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suasion that the plaintiff was not in the defendant-caused category. In
other words, the defendant would have the burden of persuasion on
the existence of an adequate causal model that would warrant and
compel a direct inference to a low subjective probability. The defendant would be entitled to an instruction, however, that if the defendant proves that the true percentage of defendant-caused cases is less
than 50%, based on a causal model that takes into account a reasonably complete set of the significant causal risk factors present in the
plaintiff's case, then the jury must find a (subjective) probability for
the plaintiff less than 0.5 (that is, the jury must find for the defendant)." 5 For example, any biasing effects due to plaintiff self-selection might be introduced into the case in this manner, with the burden of persuasion on the defendant." 6
Other approaches are possible. For example, the plaintiff might
be given some burden of persuasion on generic causation, with the
burden of showing, on the basis of relevant statistics, that the defendant created a "substantial" increased risk for persons in the reference
situation-a risk perhaps in excess of some threshold amount, ranging
up to 50%. If such a substantial risk were shown, then the defendant
would have the burden of showing that additional risk factors present
in the plaintiff's case in fact compelled a lower subjective probability
that is not "substantial."
This last approach illustrates the distinction between my theory
of direct inference and judicial policies about compensation for increased risk. Whether or not society should compensate victims of
increased risk through judicial action is a pressing contemporary issue
of tremendous importance. The theory that I am putting forward here
does not itself lead to any particular conclusion in that debate. My

115. I assume in this Article that 0.5 is the appropriate decision threshold, and the proper quantitative interpretation of the legal term "probable." That is, if a subjective probability
is less than 0.5, the conclusion is possibly true but not probably true, while subjective probabilities over 0.5 indicate that the proposition is probable. This is intended to interpret quantitatively the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. I wish to emphasize, however,
that I am merely accepting this, at this point, as a convenient and conventional assumption
about the appropriate meaning of preponderance, and about the appropriate legal significance
of the subjective probability found by the factfinder.
Given this assumption of 0.5 as the quantitative interpretation of preponderance, my
theory gives the same result as the usual judicial ruling in cases in which the plaintiff is
able to prove, on the basis of an adequate causal model, that the true percentage of defendant-caused cases is over 50% (with a resulting subjective probability over 0.5). See supra
text accompanying notes 22-25.
116. For a discussion of plaintiff self-selection, see supra part ILA.
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theory of warrant for direct inference is compatible with traditional
rejection of such compensation, as well as with adoption of compensation for mere increased risk.
Similarly, I do not here analyze any of the proposed schemes to
introduce concepts of "proportional causation" or "proportional damages,'

17

and do not discuss the various substantive policies that

might lead to such introduction. However, a word of caution deriving
from my theory is appropriate. To the extent that such proposals
effectively eliminate the requirement of specific causation in the lost
chance cases (perhaps on the argument that proof of negligence and
generic causation should be sufficient to impose liability), car& should
be taken to ensure that liability is imposed only if the logical conditions of direct inference are met. If I am correct that the requirement
of traditional specific causation has acted as a surrogate tending to
ensure that those logical conditions are met before liability is imposed, elimination of that surrogate without an adequate substitute
simply invites unfair conclusions of subjective probability. Of course,
this caveat is of little concern if what one wishes to achieve is a
radical revamping of the very basis of tort liability.
While I do not argue here that there are no compelling reasons
for introducing new concepts of compensable injury or causation, I do
suggest that the adverse collateral effects of such conceptual innovations might be unnecessary in many lost chance cases, if only the
courts were to proceed with clearer notions of probability and direct
inference. I do urge that if the courts are tempted to revise such
foundational concepts merely in an effort to address the lost chance
cases, they should do so only upon an adequate understanding of the
direct inference at the heart of those cases, and only after considering
whether less drastic measures would satisfy their concerns.

117. See generally, e.g., Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact
Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982); Steve Gold, Causation in
Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE
LJ. 376 (1986); Kaye, supra note 22; Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance
in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE
LJ. 1353 (1981); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851 (1984); Paul Sherman,
Agent Orange and the Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 369
(1986); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and
Proof. Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (1988).
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C. Sufficiency of Evidence on the Findings
Given my analysis of the logical requirements for warranted
direct inference, some comments should be made about resolving certain evidentiary problems in the lost chance cases. Jury determinations
should be minimally fair, in the sense of satisfying the probability
calculus. When all of the logical conditions for direct inference have
been satisfied and an estimate of the true percentage of defendantcaused cases is obtained that takes into account a reasonably complete
set of the significant causal factors present in the plaintiff's case, then
minimal fairness requires that the subjective probability for the specific plaintiff be set equal to that same proportion. Any other subjective
probability is unwarranted. In order to make such a direct inference, a
reasonable factfinder must have sufficient evidence from which to
determine that the logical requirements for direct inference are met.
Hence, it is reasonable for a trial court judge to review the evidence
to determine whether such evidence has been produced by the party
urging a direct inference.'
If a party relying on direct inference
has produced insufficient evidence," 9 or if there is compelling or
uncontested evidence that all the conditions have been met and the
required subjective probability is too low (e.g., 0.1), then that party
should suffer a directed verdict on causation.
The findings required to warrant the direct inference, however,
are not simple determinations. They require the application of considerable expertise and judgment on statistical analyses of data and on
the adequacy of study design, as well as medical judgment about
particular features of the plaintiff's personal situation. In many lost
chance cases, a judicial determination that a party's evidence is insufficient as a matter of law is unwarranted. For example, a plaintiff

118. In the lost chance cases, this has generally been the plaintiff. There is no reason in
principle, however, why the defendant might not argue a direct inference from statistical
evidence as part of a rebuttal argument or an affirmative defense. In addition, there may be
policy reasons to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
119. Although a plaintiff may rely on direct inference, and if choosing tor do so should
be required to produce quantitative evidence of the quality needed to support such an inference, I do not here argue that direct inference is the only acceptable method of proof in a
lost chance case. Therefore, I do not take a position on whether quantitative evidence of the
magnitude of defendant-caused risk is required in all cases before a plaintiff can reach the
jury. For the controversy over whether quantitative evidence is required, see cases cited supra

note 8.
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who has the entire burden of production on direct inference and who
has produced statistical evidence showing that only 30% of injuries in
the reference situation are defendant-caused, might also present evidence that there is considerable uncertainty around the 30% statistic.
She might also produce testimony that there is reason to conclude
that the true proportion in her reference situation is probably higher
than 30%, because several significant risk factors present in her case
were left out of account in the available scientific studies. Judges may
have become too enchanted with the statistics, and may be too quick
to translate "49%" (an objective statistic) into "improbable" (a subjective probability), when that inference can only be warranted by qualitative judgments about the descriptive adequacy of the causal model
underlying the statistics.
Although courts have recognized that qualitative and
"particularistic" information about the plaintiff's situation is somehow
relevant to the lost chance case, they have been unclear about how
the presence of such information relates to the sufficiency of the
evidence. My analysis of the baseline risk paradox leads to the conclusion that the relevance of qualitative information is probably to
adjust the baseline risk statistics, not to remove the uncertainty
altogether.'
My theory of warranted direct inference suggests that
particularistic information is relevant only if it is about a significant
causal risk factor that is present in the plaintiff's case. If that risk
factor has not been taken into account in deriving the statistical estimate of S%,then perhaps a reasonable conclusion would be to begin
with that statistical estimate but to adjust it in one direction or the
other in arriving at a subjective probability for the particular plain2
tiff.1'
These suggestions about sufficiency of evidence are based solely
on my proposed theory of warranted direct inference. Other policy
considerations, of course, might well lead a court to influence the
jury decision in other ways as a matter of substantive law.'22 I have
120. See supra text accompanying note 15.
121. Such an inference must be based on sufficient evidence, not merely on the baseless
speculation of a willing expert witness. While I do not address the implications of my theory

for judging the admissibility of expert testimony, and for evaluating the factual and theoretical
bases for expert testimony, those are obviously important issues under my theory.
122. The issue of sufficiency of the evidence involves a range of policy considerations,
including the constitutional right to jury trial in ci'il cases. This Article does not attempt
such a complete analysis of sufficiency, but has the modest goal of listing the evidentiary
requirements in lost chance cases that could be justified solely with respect to the warrant for
direct inference.
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already suggested that the policy of creating some deterrent effect
against negligence in recurring situations with high baseline risk, or
the importance attached to the right of patients to competent medical
services, might be compelling reasons to assist the plaintiff through
judicial evidentiary presumptions or through shifting to the defendant
certain burdens of persuasion or production. By shifting the burdens
of persuasion and production on certain issues to the defendant, it
would be far more likely that the plaintiff would reach the jury. Such
burden shifting would have to be justified on substantive policy
grounds, however, and does not seem derivable from the theory of
direct inference itself.I23
V. CONCLUSION

My theory of warrant for direct inference identifies the logical
conditions for inferring subjective probabilities about specific plaintiffs
from objective generic statistics about groups. At the core of that
theory is the thesis that it is fairness to the parties, not science, that
warrants that inference. This central premise has general implications
for legal concepts and doctrines closely associated with direct inferences. Although the need for careful analysis has been prompted by
the lost chance problem, the theory I have proposed applies generally
to any situations involving residual baseline risk or direct inference.
Such reasoning from the generic to the specific is a recurring feature
of the law, and direct inference may well play a much wider role in
legal factfinding than I have examined here.
The jurisprudential intuition about the lost chance problem has
rightly been that something at the root of the cases is deeply confused, but the nature of that confusion has been uncertain. Also, the
judicial handling of the lost chance cases may provide an important
study of how forced legal solutions to inappropriately conceived problems can themselves create far more conceptual problems than they
solve. My theory of warranted direct inference returns to the root
problem in those cases by analyzing the foundations of our legal
reasoning and the meaning of the legal concept of probability. I believe that by clarifying our reasoning, at least a few of our conceptual
knots will unravel of their own accord, and that we might be able to
see better solutions to whatever tangles remain.

123. The case for a burden shift has been argued, for example, by Delgado, supra note
117, at 899-900.
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